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THE ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNAL
IN MARRIAGE CASES
JAMEs

E.

HARPSTER*

It is sometimes said by our separated brethren that, while the Catholic Church pretends opposition to divorce, those who have enough money
can get a divorce from the Church through the ecclesiastical annulment
process. A statement so absurd exhibits a complete lack of understanding of the difference between a divorce and an annulment and of the
process involved in the annulment suit. The position of Holy Mother
Church is, of course, that any marriage validly entered into is indissoluble, while any marriage which is not validly contracted is no marriage
at all. In controverted cases it is the duty of the Church to determine
the truth, and to pronounce sentence accordingly, viz., that the marriage
is a valid one and cannot be dissolved by any save God, or, the marriage
was invalid when contracted. The ecclesiastical tribunal which pronounces such sentences, like any tribunal, must have a law to administer
and rules of procedure to guide it. These are supplied by the Code of
Canon Law.
The present Code which governs the universal Church is a recent
work, having been officially promulgated on the twenty-seventh of May,
1917, and made binding on the nineteenth of May, 1918. Prior to the
adoption of the Code, Church law was a vast, complicated, and confused
mass of legislation which was of little help to the average diocesan
priests who had to apply much of it. There was no arrangement to this
legislation, and, indeed, much of it was not legislation at all. Also many
laws had been abrogated, many were mutually contradictory, and many
referred only to particular cases. These reasons,' plus the fact that the
form of most of the laws was obsolete and difficult to follow, determined
Blessed Pius X, then Supreme Pontiff, to decree a codification of all
Church law. He therefore issued a Motu-proprio2 in which he decreed
that "the laws of the universal Church be brought together and arranged
in a lucid order."' The work was also to incorporate all new legislation
and all modifications of existing legislation which the times made necessary or desirable.4 Accordingly, His Holiness appointed a Pontifical
* Ph.B., Marquette University; Third Year Law Student, Marquette University
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The reasons here given are taken from Peter Cardinal Gasparri, Praefatio ad
Codicem (Preface to the Code).
2 A Motu-proprio is an authoritative order or decree of the Pope, drawn up and
issued on his own initiative, without the advice of others, and personally
signed by him.
S Pope Pius X, Arduum sane munus, March 19, 1904.
4 Itmight be well to point out here that the Code of Canon Law does not for
the most part embrace a restatement of Sacred Scripture or of Moral or
Dogmatic Theology, which the Church is not free to change, but contains
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Commission consisting of Cardinal Codifiers, and to them he added a
group of skilled canonists as consultants. To the Metropolitans of the
whole world went a letter requesting, within four months time, suggestions as to new laws and modifications of existing legislation. These
suggestions were to be made only after a consultation by the Archbishops with their suffragans. 5 The Holy Father named Peter Gasparri
as Secretary of the Commission. On Cardinal Gasparri's shoulders fell
the heaviest responsibility for the work.
It was the lot of Benedict XV to promulgate the Code, Pius X having died during the thirteen years of its preparation. This he did in his
Constitution, Providentissima,of May 27, 1917. After briefly reviewing the history of the Code, His Holiness then stated:
"Therefore, having sought the aid of Divine Grace, trusting
in the authority of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, Motu
proprio, of our certain knowledge and in the fulness of the
Apostolic power with which we are invested, by this our constitution, which we wish to be binding for all time, we promulgate,
and we decree and order that the present Code, just as it is drawn
up, have in future the force of law for the universal Church, and
we entrust it for safekeeping to your custody and vigilence.
"That all concerned, however, may have full knowledge of
the prescripts of this Code before they become effective, we
decree and ordain that they shall not have the force of law until
Pentecost of next year, that is, on the nineteenth day of May,
1918.
"All enactments, constitutions and privileges whatsoever,
even those worthy of special mention, and customs, even immemorial, and
all other things whatsoever to the contrary notwith'8
standing."
The Code is divided and subdivided, in a logical connection of the
several matters covered, into books, parts, sections, titles, chapters, and
articles. The ultimate subdivisions are the canons. Of these canons
there are 2414.
mainly disciplinary and directive legislation as to the conduct of the affairs of
the Church in its rites, dispensations, penalties, etc. Having made these laws
in the first place, the Church is free to change them as changes in the conditions of society and the exigencies of the times dictate. However, morality
is not a mutable thing. All expressions of the Natural Law or of Divine
Positive Law are not within the legislative ken of the Church. That is to say,
she cannot abrogate, modify, or dispense their operation. Thus, where God
has made the marriage bond indissoluble, the Church cannot make it dissoluble.
The final form of the Code, while changing and adapting much, added no
actual new legislation.
5A suffragan bishop is a diocesan bishop who is subject to an archbishop as
Metropolitan. For example, the Most Reverend Moses E. Kiley, Archbishop of
Milwaukee, is Metropolitan of the Province of Milwaukee. The bishops of
Green Bay, La Crosse, Madison, and Superior are suffragan bishops within
his province.
6Pope Benedict XV, Providentissima,May 27, 1917. This translation is taken

from The Ecclesiastical Review, as quoted by the Most Reverend Amleto
Giovanni Cicognani, Canon Law (Westminster, Maryland, The Newman Press,
1934), p. 443.
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Book I, Normae generales, is a book of general rules. Comprising
the first 86 canons, it explains the nature of the Code and the extent of
its application. These introductory regulations affect the entire Code.
Book II, De Personis, deals with the laws concerning persons. It takes
up, in three parts, the clergy, religious communities and their members,
and the laity. Book III, De Rebus, concerns the regulation of the things
of the Church. It is in six parts, and deals with the Sacraments, Sacred
Places and Times, Divine Worship, the Teaching Authority of the
Church, Benefices, and the Temporal Goods of the Church. The fourth
book, De Processibus,concerns the processes of trials and judgments, of
canonization and beatification, and the application of penal sanctions.
The final book, De Delictis et Poenis, concerns offenses and penalties.
There are also certain documents before and after the canons which
are a part of the Code, but which were not drafted in the form of
7

canons.

This, then, is the Pian-Benedictine Code. It is drafted in Latin,
since thereby the Code says precisely the same thing to all peoples. A
translation is essentially and necessarily an interpretation, and, for this
reason, the Code may not be translated into the vernacular without the
approbation of the Holy See. In the subsequent discussion, therefore,
we will not attempt to render into English any of the canons discussed.
Rather, we will rest on the explanations given in the Instruction issued
on August 15, 1936, by the Sacred Congregation for the Discipline of
the Sacraments, and on the authority of the works of the Most Reverend
Archbishop Amleto Giovanni Cicognani,8 of the Reverend Stanislaus
Woywod, O.F.M., 9 of the Reverend William J. Doheny, C.S.C.,10 and
of the Reverend T. Lincoln Bouscaren, S.J.'1
In the few years of the existence of the Code much has been written
concerning it. Indeed, only a few specialized students could hope to
7 The documents inserted before the canons are: 1. Praefatio ad Codicem by
Cardinal Gasparri; 2. the Constitution, Providentissima (supra, note 6); 3.
the Motu-proprio Cire iuris canonici, of September 15, 1917, by which Pope
Benedict XV established a Pontifical Commission for the official interpretation
of the Code. Following the canons are nine documents. The first three of
these, together with the last one, concern the vacancy of the Apostolic See and
the procedure during the election of a new pope. The fourth document has to
do with the appointment of priests to vacant parishes, while the fifth deals
with the Sacrament of Penance. The following three documents are all concerned with marriages contracted in infidelity in the West Indies by converts
who had been polygamists. According to Cicognani, op. cit., p. 425, by virtue
of Canon 1125, these last three mentioned documents apply with equal force
to all places where similar conditions obtain.
8 Cicognani, op. cit., supra, note 6.
9 Stanilaus Woywod, O.F.M., A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon
Law, revised by Callistus Smith, O.F.M. (New York, Joseph F. Wagner, Inc.,
1948), 2 volumes.
10 William J. Doheny, C.S.C., Canonical Procedure in Matrimonial Cases (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1948), 2 volumes.
"IT. Lincoln Bouscaren, S.J., The Canon Law Digest (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1934, '43, '49), 2 volumes and Supplement.
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read and grasp all of this mass of material. It is with humility, then,
that we write this article. For in these few pages we cannot hope to do
justice to the subject of which we treat. Yet, aside from the interest of
the lawyer in the form and application of laws, there is some need of
making our civil attorneys conversant with the general and basic procedural rules of Canon Law. Often attorneys are faced with a divorce
petition where one or both of the parties are Catholic. Conscientious
lawyers, aware of their civil duty to affect a reconcilation, if possible, 2
and concerned about the consciences of their clients, will advise such
Catholics that divorce, per se, is morally impossible for them. Should
their clients persist in their intentions, these attorneys will attempt to
place their cause before an ecclesiastical court for its decision before
proceeding with the civil action. To do this, however, the attorney
must possess a certain modicum of knowledge which most do not
possess. We will attempt, in this article, to briefly outline the adjective
or procedural law with which the Church tribunals are concerned in
matrimonial cases. Substantive law will not be dealt with. The attorney
is advised to consult competent ecclesiastical authority for the valid
causes for annulment in individual cases.
I. THE COURTS
The Pope, as successor to the primacy of St. Peter, holds the supreme administrative, legislative, and judicial authority of the Church.
Immediately inferior to the Pope are the various Sacred Congregations,
Tribunals, and Offices of the Roman Curia. These departments are, in
effect, assistants to the Supreme Pontiff in much the same way as
Cabinet officers are assistants to the President. Thus, while there are
cases involving certain people which only .the Roman Pontiff may
judge (causae majores), he ordinarily delegates this authority to one of
the various departments of the Curia. When so delegated, the designated Congregation or Tribunal has exclusive authority. 3 Cases, including marriage cases, which the Pope has the exclusive right to judge
are those involving heads of states, their sons and daughters, and persons who have the immediate right of succession as heads of state, e.g.,
heirs to a throne, presidents-elect, and governors-elect.' 4
Marriage cases for all others are handled in the following manner.
The Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office has exclusive jurisdiction
Szymanski v. Szymanski, 151 Wis. 145, 138 N.W. 53 (1912). The court
said, at page 147, "The policy of the law favors the reconciliation of the
contending spouses . . . the resumption and continuance of the marriage relation. the solidarity of the family, and the end of litigation, especially divorce
litigation. . . . Such counsel should promote settlement and reconciliation of
parties wherever possible, even at the sacrifice of his fees when necessary."
13 Can. 1962; Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, August
15, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as simply the Instruction), Art. 2 §2.
14 Can. 1557 §1.
12
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in marriage cases involving a non-Catholic. It may adjudge the case
itself, or may refer it to the Tribunal of the Sacred Roman Rota, as it
deems fitting.'5 The Sacred Congregation for the Discipline of the Sacraments decides all other cases concerning the validity of marriage, except those requiring further discussion or investigation. In the latter
instance, it must refer the cases to the Sacred Roman Rota. 16 The
Roman Rota is an ordinary collegiate tribunal consisting of a certain
number of judges who try cases in rotation, three judges constituting
one tribunal. At its head is a Dean, who is the first among equals. In
some cases the entire body of judges sits as a single court. The Sacred
Rota tries appeals of marriage cases which have been brought to the
Holy See from the courts of any diocese. 17 Practically all cases within
the jurisdiction of the Congregation of the Sacraments go directly to
the Rota.'
Often spoken of as the supreme court of the Church is the Supreme
Tribunal of the Signatura Apostolica. This court tries cases which concern:
1. The violation of secrecy by a judge of the Roman Rota, and the
damages due a party because of the invalid or unjust acts of a judge of
the Rota;
2. A plea of suspicion against any of the judges of the Rota
3. A plea of nullity against a sentence handed down by the Rota;
4. A petition for the restitutio in integrum against a sentence of the
Sacred Rota which has become res judicata;
5. Recourses against sentences of the Rota in matrimonial cases
which that court refused to admit to a new trial;
6. Disputes over competency which arise between inferior tribunals; and
7. Petitions offered to the Holy Father to obtain the commitment
of a case to the Sacred Roman Rota.'
The Signatura Apostolica has no other appellate jurisdiction than
that herein listed. It is not, therefore, a regular court of appeal.
The Code of Canon Law is not officially interpreted by any of these
Congregations or Tribunals. Canon 17 states that an interpretation of
the law given in the sentence or judgment of a court has no force of
law, and binds only those persons to whom it is given. The exclusive
right to interpret the Code was given to a Pontifical Commission by
15 Can. 247; 249 §3.

16 Can. 249 §3; Instruction, Art. 2 §4.
17 Can. 1599; Instruction, Art. 216 §1. By virtue of Canon 1600, the causae

majores are absolutely excluded from the jurisdiction of the Rota.

1 For a discussion of the Studium conducted by the Rota to train advocates,

cf. infra, page 255.

29 Can. 1603.
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Pope Benedict XV.2o This Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the Code has absolute authority in this regard. It therefore
possesses ordinary legislative authority. In matters of great importance
the Commission must consult that Sacred Congregation within whose
2
province the matter ordinarily lies before handing down its decision. 1
It is, of course, necessary that the Code be sometimes interpreted by
the courts in order to arrive at a judgment. In the absence of an express explanation of a canon by the Pontifical Commission, the Code is
often interpreted in the light of the law existing prior to its adoption.
For, in many instances, Canon Law is merely a reiteration of previous
ecclesiastial law. Earlier interpretations are, therefore, applicable to
the new Code.
Marriage cases are brought in the first instance in the proper diocesan marriage court.22 In every diocese such a court has been established by the Bishop for the exclusive purpose of handling matrimonial
cases. These are collegiate tribunals, that is, courts consisting of at least
three judges. The court is presided over by the Officialis of the diocese,
or by one of his assistants, Vice-Officiale. 23 The Oficialis is appointed
by the Bishop and constitutes one tribunal with him. An appeal cannot,
therefore, be taken to the Bishop from his diocesan court. Rather, the
appeal goes to the archdiocesan court in which province the court of the
first instance sits. In the case where the archdiocesan court is the court
of the first instance, 24 the appeal is taken to another archdiocesan court,
which the Archbishop, with the concurrence of the Holy See, has appointed to be, for all time, the proper court of appeal from his own
court. A suffragan Bishop's court may be designated instead of the
court of another province for such appeals. The Sacred Roman Rota
has concurrent appellate jurisdiction with these inferior tribunals, and
20Motu-proprio of Benedict XV, September 15, 1917, Acta Apostolicae Sedis,

IX, 483.

21

Ibid. In the same instrument His Holiness laid down the manner in which

the Code may be amended. The Sacred Roman Congregations were forbidden
thereafter to issue any new General Decrees unless some grave necessity
required it. In the future the Sacred Congregations, if they felt there was a
need for a new decree which conflicted with the present Code, were to present
it to the Supreme Pontiff for approval. After approval it was to be submitted
to the Code Commission, who would draft it into the form of canons. It was
to be the function of the Commission to determine at what place the new

canons were to be inserted, and which old canons were to be withdrawn from

the Code. Canons not affected by the changes were not to be renumbered,
however, in order to make room for the new ones. This is the present manner
of amendment.
22 See Section IV, JURISDICTION, infra, p. 259, for an explanation of how to determine which court has competency in individual cases.
23 In the Archdiocese of Milwaukee the Officialis is the Very Reverend John A.

Wieczorek, 2000 W. Wisconsin Avenue, Milwaukee.

24 This situation arises when anyone living under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop, but not under a suffragan, brings an action. Such is the case when a

resident of Milwaukee sues for a declaration of nullity.
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the latter may, therefore, be skipped entirely by appealing to the Holy
See, as we shall point out in the following section.
II. APPEALS
Redress against the sentence of the court of the first instance, or
that of the second or third instance, may be had by two methods: by
the complaint of nullity and by the appeal. The complaint of nullity is
an allegation that there was some extrinsic defect in the sentence issued,
e.g., the incompetency of the court for lack of jurisdiction, It is addressed to the court that issued the sentence. An appeal, on the other
hand, is addressed to a higher tribunal, and alleges the injustice of the
sentence.
As to the first redress: the nullity of a scntence may be either curable or incurable, sanable or insanable, remedial or irremedial. A sentence is invalid by reason of irremedial nullity when issued by an absolutely incompetent judge or by an insufficient number of judges as
prescribed in Canon 1576; when one of the parties to the action has not
the legal standing to bring suit; or when someone has prosecuted a suit
in the name of another without a legitimate mandate to do so.2' A sentence is invalid by reason of remedial nullity in cases where there was
no legal summons, or where the sentence was issued without the court's
reason for its decision, or where the signatures demanded by Canon
1874 are missing from the sentence, or where the date of the sentence
2

or its place of issuance is omitted.

.

Although the term "irremedial nullity" is used in respect to certain
cases, this does not mean that absolutely nothing can be done to validate
them. As we have said, a complaint of nullity is presented to the court
issuing the sentence. But, in cases of irremedial nullity, that court is
without authority to correct its own mistake in hearing the case, since
it was without authority to try the case in the first place. Therefore,
the complaint accomplishes nothing. However, by virtue of Canon 1603,
the SignaturaApostolica has the authority to remedy or sanate the sentence, and the proper recourse is a request for sanation addressed to
this tribunal. If sanation is not desired, but merely a declaration of the
nullity of the sentence, such nullity may be proposed by way of an exception, which is of its nature perpetual, 27 before any competent court,
or by way of an action brought within thirty years of the publication of
28
the sentence before the tribunal which issued the sentence.
In the cases of remedial nullity, the complaint may be introduced by
the parties, by the Defensor Vinculi, and by the Promotor ustitiae.
25 Can. 1892; Instruction,Art. 207.
26 Can. 1894; Instruction,Art. 209.
27 Can. 1667.
23 Can. 1893; Instruction,Art. 208.
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The judge, acting ex officio, may within three months time, retract,
amend, or otherwise correct the sentence. 29 There are two ways of introducing a complaint of nullity open to the party or official desiring
such declaration. The complaint may be attached to an appeal and presented within ten days, equitable time, to the higher court. Or the complaint may be introduced separately before the court rendering the sentence, provided that it is presented within three months of the publication of the sentence. If neither of these methods is adopted by an authorized person, the remedial nullity is considered automatically sanated
at the expiration of three months from the publication of the sentence 0
An appeal differs from the complaint of nullity in its object, in the
time element involved, and in the court to which it is addressed. An appeal maybe prosecuted by either of the parties or by the Promotor
Justitiae. If the sentence is in favor of the petition, i.e., if it declares
the marriage null and void, the Defensor Vinculi is obliged to file an appeal, even when a similar appeal is filed by the party upholding the marriage's validity. Should the Defensor Vinculi fail to appeal, he may be
forced to do so by the presiding judge,31 and should his failure be
culpable, he may be punished and removed from office.22 If the court
of second instance decides in favor of nullity, the Defensor Vinculi of
that court is free to appeal or to accept the sentence as in conscience he
deems best. This freedom is also allowed the Defensor Vinculi of the
court of third and succeeding instances. The Defensor Vinculi of the
third instance need not prosecute an appeal made by the Defensor Vinculi of the second instance, and the court must acquiesce in its abandonment. 2
An appeal must be filed, under ordinary rules, within ten days of the
publication of the sentence,3 4 and prosecuted within one month. The
time prescribed by the canon is equitable time, i.e., the ten days does not
begin to run until the party knows of his right to appeal or is enabled
to do so. "5Under the precepts of Canon 1902, if the appeal is not so filed
or prosecuted, the case becomes res judicata. This canon also states that
a case is irrevocably judged when two concordant sentences have been
issued, when an appeal has been made but not further prosecuted within
the prescribed time, and when the sentence issued was definitive accord29 Can. 1897; Instruction, Art. 211 §§1, 2.
30 Instruction,Art. 211 §3.
31 Can. 1986; Instruction,Art. 212 §2.
32 Can. 1625 §3.
3 Pont. Comm., May 29, 1947, Acta Ap. Sedis XXXIX, 373-374.
3 Can. 1881 ; Instruction,Art. 215 §1.
35
Time is computed so as to exclude the day of the publication of the sentence.
The ten days expire at the tenth day. Judicial holidays (all Sundays, holydays
of obligation, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, and Holy Saturday) are counted,
except when the tenth day is a judicial holiday. Where this situation arises,
the time expires at the end of the day following the judicial holiday or
holidays.
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ing to the rulings of Canon 1880.36 However, under the law contained
in Canon 1903, cases concerning the status of persons are never irrevocably adjudged. While the Code does not define what is meant by the
status of a person, marriage is obviously one such status, and it is accepted and acted upon as such.3 7 But if two concordant decisions have
been issued, the case may be appealed only upon the presentation of new
and weighty evidence. Doheny 3s explains that this new evidence need
not be such as to necessitate a peremptory reversal of the two previous
decisions, but only of such cogency as to give evidence of solid probability8 9 The value if this new evidence is appraised by the court of the
third instance, i.e., the Sacred Roman Rota or the tribunal of the Holy
Office. 40
An appeal from the diocesan tribunal is prosecuted before the Archbishop's court. However, at the discretion of the appellant, this court
may be passed over completely, the appeal being made directly to the
Sacred Roman Rota or the tribunal of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office. Even though the appellant has filed with the
diocesan appellate court, he may still file an appeal with the proper court
Canon 1880 states that there is no appeal:
1. From the sentence of the Supreme Pontiff or the SignaturaApostolica;
2. From the sentence of a judge who has been delegated by the Holy See to
judge a case, where the instrument of delegation contains a clause barring
an appeal;
3. From a sentence vitiated by an invalidating defect;
4. From a sentence which has become res judicata;
5. From a final sentence which is based on an oath taken to end litigation
ina case;
6. From an interlocutory sentence or decree, unless it has the force of a final
sentence (cf. note 217, infra);
7. From a sentence in a case in which the law demands that the matter be most
speedily settled;
8. From a sentence of contempt of court, where satisfaction has not been
made; and
9. From a sentence against a person who has, in writing, waived his right
to appeal.
-9 A sentence in a marriage case does become res judicata, however, when the
bond of marriage has been severed by the death of one of the parties. Decision, Sacred Roman Rota, June 20, 1922, Acta Ap. Sedis, XIV, 600. Woywod,
op. cit., II, p. 384, states that the reason for this is that Canon 1903 merely
restates the law in effect before the Code, and that the former law was uniformly so interpreted.
38 Op. cit., I, p. 533.
s9 Instruction, Art. 217 §3.
oDoheny, op. cit., I, p. 534, note, gives an example of a matrimonial case which
0
was appealed four times after two concordant decisions:
"1. Decision of Diocesan Tribunal, Non constat de nullitate [i.e., the marriage
is valid].
2. Decision of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, Non constat de
nullitate.
3. S. R. Rotae Dec., I (1909), 155, Seven Judges, Non constat de nullitate.
4. S. R. Rotae Dec., IV (1912), 33, Ten Judges, Non constat de nullitate.
5. S. R..Rotae Dec., XV (1923), 274, Ten Judges, Constat de nullitate [i.e., the
marriage was void].
6. Signatura Apostolica, July 30, 1924, Constat de nullitate. Decision reported
in S. R. Rotae Dec., XV (1923), 292."

36
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of the Apostolic See, unless the Archbishop's court has already issued
the legal citations. In the latter case, the appellant must await the trial
and decision of this court before appealing to Rome.4
In Canon Law a court of appeal does not approve or disapprove the
findings of law and fact of the lower court, nor its decision, except indirectly. The function of the court of appeal is to retry the case. It, too,
is a collegiate tribunal, having similar rules of procedure to those of the
court of the first instance. 42 The rules given in the following sections
apply equally to trials in the court of first instance.
When an appeal is made, copies of the acts recorded in the case
must be bound, indexed and forwarded to the appeal court, with an
affidavit of the actuary or the chancellor testifying that the copies are
correct. If the vernacular language of the appeal court differs from
that of the previous court, the acts must be translated into Latin. If the
copies of the acts can be made only with grave inconvenience, then the
originals may be forwarded, proper precautions being taken for their
safety.43
III.

THE OFFICERS OF THE COURT

Those persons necessary to the conduct of a case in which the
validity of a marriage is questioned are the judges, including the presiding judge (Officialis), the auditor, and the Ponens, the Defensor Vinculi, the Promotor Justitiae, the court messengers and apparitors, the
notary, the attorneys, and the advocates.
By virtue of Canon 1576, every case involving the validity of the
matrimonial bond must be tried by a collegiate tribunal of three judges.
So strict is this injunction that any definitive sentence given contrary to
it is vitiated by irremedial nullity.4 4 At the head of this tribunal is the
presiding judge. The presiding judge is always the Officialis of the diocese or one of the Vice-Officiales.4 5 Canon 1573 makes it mandatory
for every Bishop to appoint an Officialis who shall be possessed of the
ordinary power to judge in all ecclesiastical cases, excepting only those
which the Bishop has reserved to himself. Such reservations by the
Bishops are generally limited, and, when made, are strictly interpreted,
since they constitute restrictions on the power given in law to the Offi41 Instruction, Art. 216 §3.
42 Can. 1595; Instruction, Art. 213.
43 Can. 1644; Instruction, Art. 105 §2.
4However, it seems proper for the Bishop to appoint two additional judges to
help decide a specific case where the present judges continue in a deadlock or
absolute confusion.
45 Can. 1577; Instruction, Art. 14 §2. It is the opinion of Doheny, based on the
language employed in Canons 1576 and 1892, that a decision rendered by a
collegiate tribunal in which an ordinary judge acted as the presiding judge
would be a valid sentence, even though the action of the presiding judge in
assuming the office would be unlawful.
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cialis. Only one Officialis may be appointed in each diocese, and, upon
appointment, he becomes and constitutes one tribunal with the Bishop.
However, the Code does not limit the number of Vice-Officiales whom
the Bishop may name. This is left to his discretion, and depends upon
the number of cases tried annually by the ecclesiastical courts in his diocese. The Vice-Officialis also enjoys ordinary jurisdiction with the Officialis.
The term of office of the Officialis"6 is indeterminate, depending
upon the will of the Bishop. When the Bishop dies, the Off cialis retains
his office during the vacancy of the bishopric, but the new Bishop must
confirm his appointment when he assumes office.
Canon 1573 lays down four qualifications necessary before a man
may fill the office of Ofllcialis: (1) he must be a priest ;47 (2) he must
have an irreproachable reputation; (3) he must be at least thirty years
of age; and (4) he must possess the degree of Doctor of Canon Law,
or, at least, have a thorough knowledge of it.
The Officialis has a triple responsibility. He acts as a single judge
in those cases requiring only one judge; he acts as the moderator of the
collegiate tribunal; and he acts as the presiding judge of that court. The
Instruction, in Article 68, sets forth the rights ard duties of the presiding judge. He has the right to perform the following acts:
1. He directs the trial and determines what is necessary for the
administration of justice.48
2. He appoints the Ponens or acts himself in this office. 49
3. He decides any exception of suspicion that is made against the
Defensor Vinculi, the Promotor Justitiae, and the other judges (together with the remaining judge who is not suspect),50
4. He may order that the briefs and documents be printed as, in
his discretion, he deems best.5 1
5. He may limit the length of briefs, unless this is regulated by
special rules of the tribunal.52
6. He determines when the judges are to meet for deliberation,"3
54
and directs the discussion at this meeting.
4 Hereinafter where we use the term 011cialis, unless expressly excepted, we are

referring also to the Vice-Officiales.
47 Prior to the Code it was the custom in certain dioceses for lay canonists to act
as judges in matrimonial cases. The Sacred Congregation of the Council was
asked whether the custom of 170 years standing -was of such force as to permit a continued toleration of it. The Sacred Congregation replied: In the
negative. Therefore, not only the Officialis, but all judges must be priests.
This is the manifest requirement of Canons 1573 and 1574. Resolution, Sacred
Congregation of the Council, December 14, 1918, Acta Ap. Sedis, XI, 128.
4 Can. 1573; 1577 §2; Instruction, Art. 14 §2.
49 Can. 1584; Instruction, Art. 22.
50 Can. 1614 §3; Instruction, Art. 31 §3.
5' Can. 1863 §3; Instruction, Art 179 §§3, 4.
52 Can. 1864; Instruction, Art. 182.
53 Can. 1871; Instruction, Art. 185.
54 Can. 1871 §3; Instruction, Art. 198 §3.
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7. He may permit oral discussion of the case by the parties. 55
8. He disciplines those who fail in the respect and obedience which
should be shown the court. 5
9. He ascertains the identity of the plaintiff and other parties to
prevent a fraudulent substitution of persons.57
10. He attempts the reconciliation of the parties, or urges the celebration of a valid marriage if the first was invalid.5
In addition the presiding judge may also perform the following
duties, unless the tribunal has expressly reserved these, or any of them,
to itself :
1. He may act as the Ponens.5"
2. He may determine the joining of issues in pleading. 0
3. He may determine the time limits to be allowed for the furnish61
ing of proofs and for presenting the defense.
4. He may force disobedient witnesses to testify, even to the extent
62
of imposing fines if that is necessary.
5. He may approve the taking of depositions before the litis conof the impending death or retestatio where that is necessary because
63
moval to a distant place of witnesses.
6. He may indemnify the witnesses and levy fees.6 4
7. He appoints experts after a consultation with the Defensor Vin65
culi, and may determine their fees.
8. He appoints advocates ex officio. 16
9. He rules on the inspection of documents.0 7
68
10. He declares the litis contestatio.
69
11. He declares the conclusion of the case.
70
12. He announces the abatement of proceedings.
7
13. He admits the renunciation of the instance.
Also the presiding judge may undertake the duties of the auditor,
unless one already has been appointed.
55 Can. 1866; Instruction, Art. 186 §1.
56 Can. 1640 §2.

Instruction, Art. 58; Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, March 27, 1929, Acta Ap. Sedis, XXI, 490.
58 Can. 1965.
59 Instruction, Art. 22 §2.
60 Can. 1726; Instruction, Art. 87, 88.
61 Can. 1862; Instruction, Art. 179 §1.
- Can. 1766 §2; Instruction, Art. 127 §2.
- Can. 1730.
6 Can. 1787; 1909 §2; Instruction, Art. 235 §1.
65 Can. 1787 §2; 1793 §1; 1805; 1913 §1; Instruction, Art. 141; 150; 235 §1.
66 Can. 1655 §2; 1916; Instruction, Art. 43 §2; 237.
67 Instruction, Art. 163-167.
6 Can. 1726-1731; Instruction, Art. 85-88.
69 Can. 1860 §3; Instruction, Art. 177.
70 Can. 1736-1739; 1850 §1.
71
Can. 1740; 1741.
57
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The remaining two judges of the collegiate tribunal are chosen by
the Bishop or by the Officials from the synodal or prosynodal judges.
These judges, of whom there must be not less than four nor more than
twelve,7 2 are appointed by the Bishop with the consent of the diocesan
synod, hence the name synodal. Since a synod meets only once each
decade, and vacancies may occur in the interim, the Bishop is empowered, under the provisions of Canon 386, to appoint judges outside of
the synod upon the advice of the Cathedral Chapter, or, in some circumstances, of the board of Diocesan Consultors. These latter judges
are known as prosynodal judges, and they enjoy the same privileges
and have the same duties as the synodal judges. The term of office of
all judges (other than the Officious) expires at the end of ten years, or
earlier, if a new synod is held earlier. They may finish any case upon
which they are working at the time the synod is convened, however.
These judges cannot be removed from office without grave reason, and
then only upon the advice of the Cathedral Chapter or the board of
Diocesan Consultors. Nor do they need the confirmation of a new
Bishop to continue in office. As a general rule the judges are chosen by
rotation to act in cases, although this rule may be deviated from where
one or more specialized talents of a certain judge are desired for a
specific case.
From the synodal or prosynodal judges, the Bishop appoints one or
74
73
more auditors. It is the duty of these judges to cite and examine
witnesses, and to draw up such other judicial acts as are provided for
according to the tenor of their appointment.75 Further, they may make
judicial inspections, 76 examine and compare documents, 77 receive the
written report of the court messenger concerning the service of summons,7 8 and administer oaths to witnesses.79 However, an auditor may
never pronounce a definitive sentence.80 If the auditor cannot be appointed from among the synodal or prosynodal judges, he may be any
priest of learning and good judgment in the diocese. In this eventuality,
however, he may not exercise any of the rights reserved to judges.
In the civil courts of this country having more than one judge, the
chief justice always designates one justice to write the majority opinion.
So also is the practice in the ecclesiastical collegiate tribunals. This officer is known as the Ponens or Relator. He is appointed by the presiding judge, and may be removed by him for a just cause."' It is his duty
72 Can.
73 Can.
7 Can.
'7 Can.

385.
1715 §2.
1773.
1582; Instruction, Art. 24.

70 Can. 1807.

7 Can. 1821 §2.
78 Can. 1722 §1.
9 Can. 1767 §1, 1797 §1.
so Can. 1582; Instruction, Art. 24.
81 Can. 1584; Instruction, Art. 22 §1.
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to report on the case at the meeting of judges, and, when the decision of
the court has been reached, to draw up the sentence and reduce it to
writing. While the Code says nothing further on the opinion, the Instruction adds the requirement that the opinion be in Latin." It is the
duty of the Ponens to embody in the opinion the motives which prompted the sentence. Thus, ordinarily, he may select the most cogent and
dismiss the others. However, should the court so determine, the Ponens
is relieved of this right, and those motives indicated by the vote of the
court are to be embodied in the opinion without any exercise of discretion on the part of the Ponens.
Canon 1584 says nothing of the eligibility of the presiding judge to
act as Ponens, stating merely that he should appoint one of his associate
judges to this office, and this was formerly a much controverted point.
The Instruction has now cleared this point by providing that he may fill
this office if the rest of the court assents.a The acts of the case should
clearly indicate that this assent was given.
In any case concerning the marriage bond, an officer whose presence
is absolutely necessary to the validity of the proceedings is the Defensor
Vinculi, the Defender of the Bond.
Since marriage is a Sacrament, and may not lightly be annulled, the
position of the Defensor Vinculi is a most important one, difficult and
demanding. For it is the duty of this officer to do all that is necessary
and possible to uphold the validity of any marriage whose annulment is
sought. It follows that the priest who fills this office must be a man of
tried judgment and of irreproachable reputation. He must have extensive experience in tribunal work, and be far above the average in his
knowledge of theology and Canon Law.
Usually the Defensor Vinculi is permanently appointed by the
Bishop, but in small dioceses it is sometimes found more feasible to
appoint one as cases arise.8 4 Once appointed, the Defensor Vinculi can
be removed only for just cause. However, if he is removed for less
cause, the removal is valid although unlawful. Upon the death of the
Bishop he continues in office until the new Bishop officially notifies him
of his status. It is within the province of a newly appointed Bishop to
re-appoint him or to appoint another in his place. But until notification,
the Defensor Vinculi retains his office.
Under the prescriptions of Canon 1968, the Defensor Vinculi has
these duties:
1. To be present at the examination of the parties, the witnesses,
and the experts.
82 Instruction, Art. 22 §1.
83 Instruction, Art. 22 §2.
84 Instruction, Art. 15 §1.
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2. To present to the judge a sealed and signed interrogatory for
the examination of the parties and witnesses.
3. To suggest new questions arising during the course of the examination.
4. To consider the points proposed by the parties and to contradict
them where that is necessary.
5. To examine the documents presented by the parties.
6. To write animadversions against the nullity of the marriage and
to state the proofs for the validity of the marriage.
7. To do everything necessary to uphold the marriage bond. 5
While it is the right and duty of the judge to question witnesses on
his own motion, he must first examine them according to the interrogatory submitted to him by the Defensor Vinculi. The rights enjoyed by
the Defender of the Bond in regard to the questioning of witnesses is
extensive. His interrogatory precedes all others; he may recast the
questions proposed by the parties, which must be submitted to him before the examination, particularly if he deems them leading or suggestive; he may examine the interrogatory of the Promotor Justitiae, but
he may not change or recast them; and finally, he may propose questions during the actual examination. In this latter case, however, he
gives his questions, either orally or in writing to the judge, who in turn
proposes them to the witness. The Defensor Vinculi never has the right
to question witnesses directly.
Canon 1969 lays down the following additional rights of the Defensor Vinculi:
1. To inspect the acts of the case at any stage of the trial, even
though they have not as yet been published; to ask for more time to
complete his written defense, which time is to be granted to him in the
prudent discretion of the judge.
2. To be informed of all the proofs and allegations in such a manner that he has an opportunity to prepare objections.
3. To request that additional witnesses be summoned to testify,
even though the taking of evidence has been completed and published;
and to submit new evidence and objections.
4. To demand that other acts be drafted, unless the tribunal by
unanimous vote decides against him 8 6 However, unless the vote of the
court is unanimous in declining to draft additional documents, the will
of the Defensor Vinculi prevails.
In a letter dated January 5, 1937, addressed to the Archbishops,
Bishops, and Ordinaries of the world, the Sacred Congregation of the
Sacraments denounced the practice of Defenders of the Bond express85 Can. 1968; Instruction, Art. 70.
86 Can. 1969; Instruction, Art. 71.
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ing themselves as to the truth of the cases in which they are acting. This,
declared the Sacred Congregation, is "an attitude so far removed from
the provisions of the law that there is no room for dispute about it (cf.
Canon 1968, 30, and the Rules of this Sacred Congregation of 7 May,
1923, n. 28)." This office was reserved to the courts and to the Bishops.
Therefore the Reverend Prelates were instructed to communicate to
the Defenders of the Bond in their dioceses "that it is their right and
duty to bring up in trial all that they deem necessary or useful in defense of the marriage, and, at the close of the trial, to draw up carefully
observations in favor of the consummation of the marriage, drawn from
the record, either as regards matters of procedure or of substantive law,
without giving their opinion on the merits of the case."
However, on October 2, 1944, in an Allocution delivered to the Prelate Auditors and other off'ials of the Sacred Roman Rota, His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, substantially modified the rule enunciated by the
Congregation of the Sacraments. The Supreme Pontiff declared:
"On the other hand, it cannot be demanded of the Defender
of the Bond that he draw up a defense at any cost; an artificial
defense without care as to whether or not his statements have a
solid foundation. Such a demand would be contrary to right
reason. It would burden the Defender of the Bond with a useless, worthless task. It would contribute no claification, but rather
a confusion of the question. It would harmfully prolong the
process. In the very interest of truth and by the dignity of his
office the Defender of the Bond must, therefore, be accorded the
right to declare, whenever the case requires, that after a diligent,
accurate and conscientious examination of the acts he has discovered no reasonable objection to be made against the petition
of the plaintiff or the petitioner. * * *
"Nor should it be objected that the Defender of the Bond
must write his animadversions not 'pro rei veritated but 'pro validitate matrimonii.' If by this is meant that the Defender of the
Bond must emphasize all that favors or all that is not opposed to
the existence or the continuance of the bond, the observation is
indeed accurate. But if, instead, is intended the affirmation that
the activity of the Defender of the Bond is not likewise bound
to serve the ultimate purpose, namely, the ascertainment of the
objective truth, but that he must unconditionally and independently of the proofs and results of the process sustain the imposed
thesis of the existence or necessary continuance of the bond, this
assertion must be adjudged as false. Thus all those who participate in the process must without exception direct their efforts
toward the sole end: 'pro rei veritate!' ,,87
Of equal importance to a trial involving the bond of marriage is the
Promotor Tastitiae, the Promoter of Justice. This court officer is ap87 Pope Pius XII, Allocution to the Sacred Roman Rota, October 2, 1944, Acta
Ap. Sedis, XXXVI, 281-290. (This translation is taken from Doheny, op. cit.,
I, pp. 1100-1101).
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pointed in the same manner as the Defensor Vinculi, s and should have
the same requisites as the latter. It is the duty of the PromotorJustitiae
to safeguard the public good. Specifically he has the right and duty to
impugn any marriage which he believes to be invalid by reason of an
impediment which is of its nature public." His is also the duty of enforcing strict adherence to procedural law. He may do this by calling
the court's attention to violations of this law, and, if necessary, the attention of the Bishop. It follows that he be not only exceptionally well
versed in Canon Law, but, a fortiori, an expert on procedure.
The Instructionhas ruled that three conditions must exist before the
Promotor Justitiae may attack the validity of a marriage on his own
motion:
1. There is a question of an impediment which has become public
and which is based on argument so certain and valid either in fact or in
law, that there can be no serious doubt as to the existence of the impediment.
2. The public good, namely, the removal of scandal, really demands
this, in the judgment of the Ordinary.
3. That even upon the cessation of the impediment it is impossible
that the marriage be duly contracted.9 0
Notice that while the Promotor ustitiae acts in his own right in instituting the action, he must await the judgment of the Ordinary as to
whether the public good demands the suit.
However, if someone, not allowed in law to attack the marriage, 1
denounces the marriage to him, or if such person denounces the marriage to the Bishop (who must refer the matter to him9 2), it is the duty
of the Promoter of Justice to investigate the facts. If he is of the
opinion that the denunciation is just, he must attempt to get the marriage validated. If the parties refuse to cooperate in such validation, he
has no recourse but to institute an action to have the marriage annulled.
Although they take no part in the trial proceedings, court messengers
or couriers are necessary to the proper functioning of the tribunal. They
are appointed by the Bishop, and can be removed only by him. 93 Court

messengers may be appointed for all trials in general or for a designated
case. It is their duty to carry notices of judicial acts, summons, and the
like, at the behest of the court. Apparitors (constables) are appointed
in like manner as messengers and for like terms in the discretion of the
Bishop."' It is their duty to execute the sentences and decrees of the
88 Can. 1587; Instruction, Art. 16 §2.
89 Can. 1971; Instruction, Art. 35 §1, 20.
90 Instruction, Art. 39.
91
For a discussion of those persons only who are permitted to impugn a marriage, cf. page 264.
92 Instruction, Art. 40.
93 Can. 373; 1591; 1592; Instruction, Art. 18 §§1, 2.
94 Ibid.
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court. Both messengers and apparitors should be laymen, unless prudence indicates the appointment of a priest. The same person may occupy both positions.
Some courts in the United States have. dispensed with these
officials, substituting the use of registered mail. In extraordinary
cases, temporary officers are appointed.
Canon 1585 provides that there must be present at every trial a
notary who acts as the clerk of the court. Any trial held without his
presence is invalid, with only one exception not having to do with
matrimonial trials. One or more notaries are appointed by the Bishop
for his diocese, and a clerk is selected for each trial by the presiding
judge, unless the Bishop appoints one for a specified trial himself.
Notaries may be laymen or clerics, except the Chancellor of the
diocese, who is, by virtue of his office, a notary. Canon 372 provides
that the Chancellor must be a priest. The notary has the duty to write
all of the acts and proceedings of the trial in his own handwriting,
and to show the acts and documents on file to those who have the
right to see them. 95 In addition, Article 73 of the Instruction lays
down the following duties as belonging to the notary: (1) to transcribe everything diligently and carefully; (2) to gather and preserve
all the acts properly and conscientiously; (3) to preserve the secrecy
of the acts;96 (4) to attest all documents ;97 (5) to sign all documents
together with the presiding judge;98 (6) to arrange properly the
protocol or the register of cases; (7) to make copies of the interrogatory;9 (8) to be present whenever an oath is legally administered;100 (9) to sign the citations and to record the receipt thereof;'101

(10) to be present at the drafting of the process and at all oral
discussions ;102 (11) to certify the authenticity of copies ;103 (12) to
take care that rescripts, decrees, and decisions are delivered for
execution;104 (13) to inform the parties of the sentence; and (14)
to sign the original copies of the sentence and to certify copies of
them."0 5
Important to any party in an action is his lawyer. Canon Law
has provided for every party, not only his lawyer, but also a proxy.
These two offices will be considered together, inasmuch as they are
so handled by the Code and by the Instruction. What we know in
95 Can. 374.
9 Can. 1645 §3.

9 Can. 1585 §1; 1813 §1, 20.

98 Can. 1585 §1.

99 Can. 1745.
100 Can. 1621; 1622; 1623.
01

'

102

Can. 1715 §2; 1722.

Can. 1706-1710; . 1773 §1; 1778; 1866.
§1, 30

103 Can. 374
104

Can. 1813 §1, 20.

105 Can. 374 §1, 30; 1874 §5; 1894 30

.
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civil law as the attorney or lawyer is known in Canon Law as the
advocate, while the person we would designate as a proxy is known
in the Code as the attorney. The office of an attorney" 6 is to act as a
proxy for the party appointing him. He holds that party's power of
attorney and represents him in every way throughout the trial, acting
as a juridical person. His duties include presenting the bill of complaint and instituting the appeal.'0 7 Obviously, however, the attorney
cannot testify in the place of the parties. Therefore, the presence of
the proxy does not relieve the party of appearing in court in all
cases, but he need only appear on those occasions when the law or an
order of the judge requires this of him.' s All legal aspects of the
case are reserved exclusively to the care of the advocate. In matrimonial cases both positions are usually filled by the same person.
While it is the right of any party to be represented by an advocate, often there is no necessity for this. If both spouses insist on the
nullity of the marriage, or if both oppose such declaration, one advocate may act for both. And where one party attacks the validity
of his or her marriage, and his or her consort supports it, the latter's
position is amply safeguarded by the action of the Defensor Vinculi.
The Code requires that both advocates and attorneys must be
Catholics, over twenty-one years of age, and of good reputation. 0 9
A non-Catholic may be admitted to act in these offices, but only by
way of necessity. Prudence might occasionally dictate that a person,
not a Catholic, representing a party in a civil court, perform the same
office in the ecclesiastical court. Under the prescriptions of the Code,
the advocate must be a Doctor of Canon Law, or be at least expert
in it."1 ° The Instruction, however, has raised these requirements. It
insists that the advocate have his doctorate, and, morever, have completed at least three years of forensic apprenticeship "in a praiseworthy manner.""' In reference to attorneys the Instruction states
that they "should" (as distinguished from the word "must" as used
in reference to advocates) have at least a licentiate in Canon Law,
and have at least one year of forensic apprenticeship. 12 The Sacred
Congregation is most solicitous that this apprenticeship be passed at
the Studium of the Sacred Roman Rota.
The Studium of this tribunal presents a course of studies and
work that would be overwhelming to the average American law
student. Ordinarily an applicant is not admitted to the course unless
he has previously obtained the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and
106 Our designation throughout this discussion will be that of the Code.
107 Instruction, Art. 44 §2.
208 Can. 1647; Instruction, Art. 45.
109 Can. 1657 §1; Instruction, Art. 48 §1.
120 Can. 1657.
111 Instruction, Art. 48 §2.
112 1istruction, Art. 48 §3.
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Doctor of Roman Law. Upon occasion, however, licentiates have
been allowed to attend the classes while studying for their degrees.
Each year there are about one hundred candidates taking the course.
The entire course takes three years to complete, and during this time
regular class sessions are held. In addition each student is required
to draw up a complete case in Latin each month. Father Doheny
says of the course,
"The complete course comprises three years of study and
practice. Records are kept of all the cases submitted by the
candidates as well as their interest in the work. After the
completion of three years' work the candidates are eligible for
the final examination. The written examination is a most
formidable one and generally lasts eight or ten hours without
any intermissions. The fact that only two or three candidates
qualify each year as advocates and attorneys is ample proof
that the course is not an easy one."" 3
"13 Doheny, op. cit., I, p. 169. On June 8, 1945, the Sacred Roman Rota issued a
decree on the organization of studies in the Rota. This decree provided the
following rules:
"I. The Sacred Roman Rota conducts a Course of Studies, which must be
attended for three years by all who aspire to the title of Procurator and
Advocate of the Rota.
II. The School is under the authority and supervision of the Dean of the
Sacred Roman Rota.
III. Upon presentation by the Dean, the College of Auditors elects the
Director of the School from among the Auditors, and it may elect also an
Assistant Director from among the Officials of the Sacred Tribunal.
IV. The instructors in the School shall be Auditors or Officials of the Rota,
or other persons selected each year by the Dean after consulting the Director.
V. The following courses are given in the School:
1. Judicial Deontology, that is, moral theology applied to the work of the
tribunal ;
2. Jurisprudence of various departments of canon law, especially the law
of marriage, the penal law, and the law of procedure;
3. Practice in the offices of the tribunal.
The method in use in the School consists chiefly of exercises and discussions.
VI. It is the duty of the Director to organize and arrange the prescribed
courses, to make provisions for the proper conduct of the School, to report
to the Dean on the condition of the School, and to make suggestions for its
improvement.
VII. The Assistant Director shall assist the Director in conducting the School,
keep the documents which pertain to it, and in general see that the orders of
the Director are perfectly carried out.
VIII. Those who may be enrolled in the School are clerics, secular or religious, and laymen, who have at least the licentiate in canon law and are
properly recommended by their Ordinary; clerics must moreover present a
"nihil obstat' from the Vicariate of Rome. But no one shall be admitted to
the examination for Procurator or Advocate, unless he has acquired at least
the doctorate in canon law in a University or Faculty recognized by the
Holy See.
One who has received the baccalaureate in canon law, and who wishes to
attend the School, without aspiring to the title of Procurator or Advocate of
the Rota, may apply to the Dean to be admitted as a special student.
IX. Enrollment in the School is reserved to the decision of the Dean.
Enrolled students are bound to take an oath each year according to the
usual formula; and the fact that it has been taken by each one shall be inscribed by a notary in the records.
X. The students must be present at the exercises, and must study the cases
assigned to them, give their decisions upon them, explain the questions sub-
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In addition to these requirements, both attorneys and advocates
need the approval of the Ordinary of the diocese before they may
practice in the courts of that diocese. Here again the Instruction
has made more exacting the law of the Code. Canon 1658 specifically
states that, while advocates must have the approval of the Ordinary,
attorneys may be appointed by a party without any such approval.
Article 48 §4 of the Instruction makes no such distinction. A ruling
to the same effect as the Instruction was earlier handed down by the
Signatura Apostolica."4

Before an attorney may be admitted to plead, he must deposit
with the court a written mandate from the party appointing him.
This mandate is usually attached to the bill of complaint. The
mandate must be signed by the mandator, attested by his pastor or
by a notary of the Curia (diocesan), and must bear the place and
date on which it was executed.11 5 All mandates are subjected to the
most searching scrutiny by the courts. Should even the slightest
irregularity appear, the court will refuse to proceed further until it
has been satisfied as to the validity of the mandate.
The advocate is required to have a commission similar to the
mandate of the attorney. This commission is issued either by the
party whom the advocate will represent or by the judge. 16 Both the
mitted to them, make the assigned researches in the library, and perform
other tasks of the same sort; they may also assist at oral discussions unless
the Dean or the Ponens forbids it.
XI. The students may, in accordance with the rules of the tribunal, look over
the statement of cases which are assigned to them, and also, on designated
days and hours, frequent the library of the tribunal; but they may not take
away with them either the statements of cases or books from the library.
On the completion of each task, they must return to the tribunal the summaries and whatever records they may have.
XII. The Instructors are to pass judgment on the trials of the students and
enter them in the record; and these written judgments together with the
grade attained in the examinations are to be preserved in the archives of the
School.
XIII. At the completion of each year, after a special examination, the Instructors shall give their judgment in writing on the diligence, industry, work
and merit of each student, and declare whether they deem them worthy of
being advanced to the next year; this advancement is decided by the Dean.
XIV. Upon the completion of the three years' course, if he has passed all the
annual examinations, the candidate may apply to the Dean to take the written
examination before the College of the Rota, to receive the title of Advocate
of the Rota.
If he passes this examination successfully, the candidate, upon taking the
oath before the College of the Rota, is admitted to practice as a Procurator
and Advocate and receives a diploma as Advocate of the Rota." Decree of
the Sacred Roman Rota, June 8, 1945, Acta Ap. Sedis, XXXVII, 193; quoted
from Bouscaren, Canon Law Digest (Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company,
1949), Supplement, pp. 220-222.
114 In Causa Rornana, June 23, 1923, Acta Ap. Sedis, XVI, 105.
215 Can. 1659; Instruction, Art. 49 §1. The Canon does not make necessary the
attestation of the pastor except in the case of parties who are unable to read
or write. The Instruction extends this provision to every mandate.
116 Can. 1661; Instruction, Art. 49 §4.
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mandate 17 and the commission " s must be embodied in the acts of
the case. So important is the mandate that Canon 1892 provides that
a sentence is vitiated by irremedial nullity if it is not valid, or if one
was never issued to the attorney who acted in the case.
There are three methods by which an attorney or an advocate may
cease to act in a case. First, by the handing down by the court of a
definitive sentence. Unless the right has been explicitly reserved in
the mandate, however, the attorney and the advocate have the right
and duty to act for the party in filing an appeal." 9 Since this must
be done within ten days of the publication of the judgment, their
offices expire at the end of this ten day period. Often the mandate
authorizes the attorney or advocate to act in both trials of the case
(since every matrimonial trial must be tried in two courts), but this
authorization must be clear and unmistakable for it to be effective.
Secondly, the attorney and the advocate may cease to act by their
removal by the party who appointed them. The removal is effective
upon the date that the officer becomes apprised of his removal. If
the issues have already been joined, the judge and the opposing party
20
must also be notified of the removal before it can be effective.1
Thirdly, the attorney and the advocate can be rejected by a
decree of the court. This may be done ex officio or on the petition
of the party. However, no such decree may be made unless there
exists both a just and grave reason for it. Such reason would be the
excommunication of the attorney or advocate, or his failing in his
duty to his client through culpable negligence or through a betrayal
of trust. These latter reasons never react to the prejudice of the
client in an ecclesiastical court, however, as they may and sometimes
do in our civil courts. For Canon 1619 provides that, in all cases
affecting either the common good or the salvation of souls, the judge
must step in and supply all of the proofs and exceptions which the
advocate should supply were he acting in the best interests of his
client. In cases where an advocate has been appointed by the court
to furnish legal aid without charge to a destitute party, dereliction
of duty is most severely punished, even to the extent of barring him
from further practice in the ecclesiastical courts.
His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, in his Allocution of October 2,
1944, to the Sacred Roman Rota, said of the duties of advocates:
11Can. 1660; Instruction, Art. 49 §3.
18 Can. 1661; Instruction, Art. 49 §4.
119 Can. 1664 §2 is the authorization for the attorney to continue his functions
long enough to file the appeal, while the authorization for the advocate is
contained in Art. 52 §2 of the Instruction. When either the attorney or the
advocate files an appeal, it becomes unnecessary for the other to do so.
Therefore, the authority of both ceases with the first appeal filed.
'20 Can. 1664; Instruction, Art. 52 §2.
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"The Advocate assists his client in drafting the preliminary
'libellus' of the case, in determining rightly the object and the
basis of the controversy, in expounding the salient points of
the matter to be adjudicated. The Advocate points out to his
client the proofs to be adduced and the documents to be produced. He suggests to his client the witnesses to be called in
the case and the peremptory points to be emphasized in the
deposition of the witnesses. During the trial, the Advocate
assists his client justly to evaluate and to refute the exceptions
and the opposing arguments. In a word, the Advocate
marshals and emphasizes everything that can be alleged in
favor of the petition of his client.
"In this manifold activity the Advocate may well exert
every effort to win the case of his client. However, in all his
activity, he must not withdraw himself from the sole and
common final purpose: the discovery, the ascertainment, the
legal affirmation of the truth of the objective fact. You
eminent jurists and most upright Defenders of the Ecclesiastical Tribunals assembled here today, well know how the
knowledge of that subordination must guide the Advocate in
his reflections, in his counsels, in his arguments and in his
proofs.
"You also know how this knowledge not only protects him
from elaborating factitious suppositions and from accepting
cases lacking in every serious basis, from employing fraud
and dishonesty, from inducing the parties and the witnesses
to testify falsely, from resorting to any other dishonest subterfuge, but also induces him positively to act in the whole
series of acts of the process, according to the dictates of conscience. It is necessary that the work of the Advocate as
well as that of the Defender of the Bond tend to the supreme
triumph of truth in all its radiant splendor. For both of them,
even though proceeding from opposite directions because of
the different proximate ends, must of necessity tend toward
the same final purpose." 12'
IV.

JURIsDIcTION

Necessary to any system of courts are those rules governing the
competency of any given court within that system to hear and
determine causes. Just as jurisdiction is determined in the civil
courts of this country by territorial limits (i.e., state boundaries),
so is it determined in the ecclesiastical court system, the jurisdictional
entity being either a diocese, a prefecture apostolic, or a vicariate
apostolic. In general the following rules control competency:
1. When both consorts are Catholic, the competent tribunal is
that of the district in which the marriage took place, or in which
the defendant maintains a domicile or quasi-domicile;
2. When one of the parties is not a Catholic, however, the proper
court is that of the place where the marriage was contracted, or in
121 Supra,note 87. (Translation from Doheny, op. cit., I, pp. 1102-1103).
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which the Catholic party maintains a domicile or quasi-domicile. 22
Diocesan domicile' 23 is acquired in either one of two ways: first,
by residence in a diocese combined with the intention to stay there
permanently; or second, by actual residence in one diocese for ten
years or more.' 24 If one moves into a new diocese with the intention
of permanently staying there, he acquires a domicile therein upon his
first day of residence. And this is totally unaffected by the fact that
he subsequently moves, even if he remains in residence only for one
week. It is his intention that is the determining factor. Upon his
removal, if his intention is to stay permanently in his new diocese,
or if he actually does stay therein for ten years or more, he loses his
domicile in the first diocese. In the second manner of acquiring
domicile, intention is of no importance whatsoever. Actual residence
for ten years or more operates automatically to confer canonical
domicile irrespective of intent or wish.
In order to establish a domicile, residence must be continuous.
This does not, however, prohibit absences, even prolonged absences.
For example, a student may be absent from his home for four years
or more, and still retain his domicile in the diocese in which his
home is located.
Quasi-domicile may also be acquired in two ways: first, by
residence in a diocese combined with the intention to stay therein for
the greater part of a year unless one is called elsewhere; or secondly,
by actual residence in a place the greater part of a year no matter
what the intention.1 25
There is a class of persons, called vagi,"u6 who have neither
domicile nor quasi-domicile. From the wording of Canon 1964 it
would seem that such persons can be cited only in the diocese where
the marriage took place. However, Canon 1563 rules that a vagus
has his proper forum in the place where he is actually staying.
Doheny'12 believes that this is authorization to cite a vagus before
the tribunal of the place where he is staying, particularly in those
instances where it is impossible to cite him in the diocese in which
the marriage was performed.
The Code also provides for certain necessary domiciles. A wife
shares the domicile of her husband, unless she is legitimately
122 Can. 1964; Instruction, Art. 3 §1.
12 Diocesan domicile is to be distinguished from parochial domicile. While they
are acquired in precisely the same way, they differ in the importance they
have in various Church functions. For the celebration of marriage, for
example, parochial domicile is of prime importance, whereas in determining
jurisdiction in an annulment suit, diocesaif domicile is the only consideration.
224 Can. 92.
125 Ibid.
126 Can. 91.
127 Op. cit., I, p. 23.
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separated from him; an insane person shares the domicile of his
guardian; a minor shares that of his parent or guardian.' 28 The same
canon also rules that a minor may acquire his own distinct quasidomicile after his years of infancy; that a wife not legitimately
separated from her husband may likewise acquire a quasi-domicile;
and that, if she is legitimately separated, a wife may also acquire her
own domicile. As can be seen from this, the wife of an insane
husband, from whom she is not separated, shares the domicile of
her husband's guardian. The guardian referred to in the Code is
that guardian appointed by the Ordinary of the diocese, and not to
one appointed by civil law (though they will generally be the same,
in the absence of some cause dictating a different procedure), or to
the parents of a minor incompetent.
From the foregoing discussion it may be observed that a case
properly may be tried in three, or even more, jurisdictions. This
leniency has been the occasion of grave abuse in the past, parties
establishing quasi-domiciles in distant dioceses where they are unknown and where evidence of the truth of their assertions is difficult
to obtain. In order to correct these abuses, the Sacred Congregation
of the Sacraments issued an Instruction on the 23rd of December,
1929, which set forth certain rules regulating those marriage cases
tried in a quasi-domicile. 2 9 By virtue of this Instruction, the
Officialis of the tribunal of the quasi-domicile is obliged to make a
thorough study of the case before he may accept it. He must
determine the validity of the quasi-domicile established by the plaintiff, the reason why the parties are bringing the action outside of
the diocesan domicile, and what proofs and documents are more
easily to be secured in the quasi-domicile than in the place of
domicile. He must further notify the Ordinary of the place of
domicile of the proceedings, as well as the Ordinary of the diocese
in which the marriage was contracted if that be different, asking for
aoverification of all proofs, statements and documents. He is forbidden to proceed with the cause until he has received these. If he
is notified by any Ordinary that the parties are bringing the action
before his court for a fraudulent purpose, he must decide, by a decree
or interlocutory sentence, the advisability of remanding the case to
the tribunal of that Ordinary.
Not only the Officialis, but the Defensor Vinculi as well must
study these aspects of the case. If it is his opinion that the case is
being improperly tried in his diocese, that is, the diocese of the
Can. 93.
129Instruction, Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, December 23, 1929,
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Acta Ap. Sedis, XXII, 168. This is not to be confused with the 1936 Instruction to which we have frequently referred in this article.
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quasi-domicile, he must lodge an appeal with the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments. The Defensor Vinculi of the court of second,
third, or succeeding instance may likewise refer the matter to the
Sacred Congregation for determination. If the Officialis of the court
of quasi-domicile decides that his court is competent, and the Defensor Vinculi concurs, the protesting party, if there be one, has no
recourse himself to the Sacred Congregation, but he may, upon
appeal to the court of second instance, urge his views on the new
Defensor Vinculi, who may lodge an appeal if he deems the reason
just.
When two or more courts are equally competent, that court
which first legitimately summoned the defendant to appear before
it is the proper and only court for trial.130 Jurisdiction, once
obtained by the citation of the defendant, is not lost, irrespective of a
change of domicile by one or both of the parties.' 3 '
Where one party challenges the competency of a tribunal, this
question is decided by the tribunal itself. 32 If the court decides in
favor of its own competency, where the question is of relative incompetency, there is no appeal from this decision. If the court
adjudges itself incompetent, the aggrieved party may appeal within
ten days. 133 Where the question concerns the absolute incompetency
of a court, a decision either for or against its own competency may
be appealed within a like period. 34
V. THE ORDER OF THE CALENDAR
The Code's provision as to the court calendar is very simple. All
cases are to be tried in the order in which they come before the court.
If some case is presented that requires an immediate decision, then
the court may move this case ahead of others, but a special decree
must be issued by the judge or the court stating the preference. 35
VI. THE COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION
Action is instituted through the following steps. First, the bill of
complaint is presented to the court. Second, the court must pass on
its own competency and the right of the plaintiff to bring the action.
If the court's decision is favorable on both counts, the summons of
the parties is issued. Finally there is the joinder of issues, called the
litis contestatio, and the concordance of doubt, called the concordatio
dubii. Counterclaims that are to be made must be filed immediately
'10 Can.
'3' Can.
132 Can.
133 Can.

1568; Instruction, Art. 11.
1725, 10, 20, 50; Instruction, Art. 85.
1610 §1; Instruction, Art. 9.
1610 §§2, 3; Instruction, Art. 28.
134 Instruction, Art. 29.
135 Can. 1627.

THE' ECCLESIASTICAL TRIBUNAL

after the litis contestatio. We shall consider each of these steps in
order.
The suit is opened by the plaintiff when he presents the bill of
complaint (libellus) to the court.1 38 If the plaintiff is unable to write,

he is allowed to make an oral petition to the court. In the latter
case, the notary must reduce the complaint to writing, and this is to be
read to the plaintiff and approved by him.13 7 The complaint must
contain the name of the judge before whom the case is brought, the
object of the action, the name of the defendant, a statement of the
facts, the arguments on which the plaintiff relies, and a petition that
the court aid him. Further, it must be subscribed by the plaintiff or
his proxy, must give the date of the complaint, and must show the
plaintiff's place of residence. All details relating to the domicile or
quasi-domicile of the parties should be stated, so that the court may
determine its competency.
Two things should be noted concerning the libellus. First, the
statement of facts should be short and succinct. Elaborations of
difficulties encountered in the marriage may be stated later if they
are pertinent to the issues. Secondly, all documents presented to
sustain the plaintiff's allegations must be attached to the complaint,
and, if proof is to be made through the use of witnesses, their names
and full addresses must accompany the bill.'"
As soon as possible after the complaint is presented to the court,
the judge must accept or reject it, giving reasons in the case of
rejection. If the complaint is rejected because of faults which can be
remedied by amendment, the plaintiff may submit an amended bill.
An appeal from the decree rejecting a bill of complaint may be lodged
with the next higher court within ten days of the decree. If the
appeal is prevented by impossibility or the .ignorance of the plaintiff
of his rights to this recourse, the ten days does not begin to run until
the impediment is removed. If the court refuses to hand down its
decree of acceptance or rejection within thirty days of the filing of
the complaint, the plaintiff may, by petition, insist on the court
performing its duty. If the decree is not forthcoming in the next
five days thereafter, recourse may be had to the Bishop who is
obliged to force the judge to make the decree, or, in the alternative,
39
to substitute another judge.

Two reasons which might move the judge to reject the bill are
its own incompetency or the inability of the plaintiff to act in the
ecclesiastical courts. We have already discussed competency in other
sections of this article. As to the second reason, not every person
136 Can. 1706; Instruction, Art. 55 §2.

Can. 1707 §§1, 3; Instruction, Art. 56.
Can. 1761 §1; Instruction, Art. 59.
139 Can. 1710; Instruction, Art. 67.
137
138
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may act as a plaintiff in Church tribunals. Canon 1971 provides that
the following persons are capable of attacking the validity of a
marriage: (1) the married parties in all cases of separation or of
nullity, unless they were themselves the culpable cause of the impediment; and (2) the Promoter Justitiae in impediments public of
their nature. All other persons, even blood relations, are incapable of
attacking a marriage. 1 0
There are, therefore, only three parties who may act as a plaintiff
in a suit of annulment-the husband, the wife, and the Promoter
Justitiae. As we have seen earlier, the Promotor Justitiae may only
attack the marriage if three conditions are verified. 141 In the absence
of these conditions only the consorts may question its validity. But
this is not to say that they may always do so. Canon 1971 specifically
forbids that party who was the culpable cause of the impediment
which invalidates the marriage to act as plaintiff. In case both parties
contributed to placing the impediment, then neither can ask for an
annulment. Their only recourse in such a situation is to denounce
the marriage to the Bishop or to the Promoter Justitiae.142 If the
latter is legally prohibited from attacking the marriage, then there is
no recourse. For, as in equity, the party must come into court with
clean hands. The Code Commission has declared, however, that where
a party has placed an innocent and licit cause of an impediment, he
is not estopped by virtue of Canon 1971 from impugning the marital
bond.1'3
But even though a party be not estopped by virtue of Canon 1971
from attacking a marriage, he may be so estopped by other provisions
of the law. Excommunicated persons, 44 non-Catholics,' 145 and
apostates 146 are all held to be incapable of acting as plaintiffs. These
persons may apply to the Holy Office which may admit them if there
is a special reason present. In these cases the Promoter Justitiae is
also prohibited from bringing suit without prior permission of the
Holy Office, unless the public good, in the judgment of the
14 7
Ordinary, demands it.

140

Before the enactment of the Code strangers to the marriage could attack it
on certain grounds. In 1916, the Rota declared a marriage void, at the
instance of a third party, on the grounds that the wife did not have

sufficient mental capacity to give consent.

141 Supra, page 253.
142 Decision, Sacred Roman Rota, August 11, 1928, R.D. XX, 402.
14 Pont. Comm., July 17, 1933, Acta Ap. Sedis, XXV, 345.
144 Can. 1654; 2263. In greatly restricted circumstances excommunicates may
sometimes act through an attorney.
145 Can. 87; Reply, Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, January
27, 1928, Acta Ap. Sedis, XX, 75.
146 Reply, Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, January 15, 1940,

Acta Ap. Sedis, XXXII, 52.
'4'

Reply, Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, March 22, 1939,

Acta Ap. Sedis, XXXI, 131.
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Once the competency of the court and the right of the plaintiff
to sue is established, the summons is issued. As is done under
Federal procedure, the summons is drawn and issued by the court.
It is either written on the libellus or is appended to it.14

The summons

must contain the following essential items:
1. The injunction of the judge to the defendant to appear in
court;
2. The name of the judge before whom the defendant is to
appear;
3. The nature of the case;
4. The name and surname of the person summoned;
5. The place where the defendant is to appear;
6. The date and hour of appearance;
7. The seal of the court;
8. The signature of the presiding judge (or his auditor); and
149
9. The signature of the notary.

If any of these items are omitted, the summons, the trial, and
he resulting sentence are entirely void by virtue of remedial
LUllity.

50

The summons is sent to the defendant, except where he is
mentally incompetent, in which eventuality it is sent to his guardian,
and to the Defensor Vinculi.151 Notice of the time designated in the
summons must also be sent to the plaintiff, to the end that he may
appear. 152 Where the action is instituted by the Promotor Justitiae
a copy of the summons must be directed to both parties. If the
parties voluntarily appear, no summons need issue, but the notary
must indicate in the record that such was the case. For without this
the court of appeal has no assurance that an otherwise necessary
summons was issued. Without a voluntary appearance, the summons
must be served or the whole proceedings are void in virtue of
remedial nullity. Canon 1714 rules that every summons is peremptory
and need not be repeated. There is one exception to this: if the judge
wishes to punish a party for contempt of court by reason of nonappearance, he may not do so until the party has rejected or ignored
a second summons.

53

There are several methods of serving the summons. The preferred method, and the one to be used unless impossible, is personal
1712.
1715; Instruction, Art. 76.
150 Can. 1723; Instruction, Art. 84.
151 The summons of the Defensor Vinculi (and the Promotor Justitiae, where
his presence is necessary) does not require the formalities of a summons of
the parties, and may be by any means of communication, including the
telephone.
152 Can. 1712 §3; Instruction, Art. 74 §3.
1 Can.
149 Can.

153 Can. 1845 §2.
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service by a court messenger.15 4 If the defendant is not found within
the diocese in which the case is to be tried, the court messenger may
enter any diocese in the world to accomplish service. 155 The summons
is to be handed to the defendant personally, but if he is not at the
location indicated substituted service may be made on a member of
his family or household, or on his servant, providing that person
promises to deliver the summons to the summoned person as soon as
possible.'5 6 The court messenger must sign the receipt of summons
and indicate thereon the day and hour of delivery, and he must
submit a written report to the court. The receipt must also be signed
by the summoned party or by the person who received the summons
57

for him.'

There may be a valid service also by registered mail if a return
receipt is demanded. 58 Occasionally there are obstacles present which
make personal delivery impossible, or at least difficult. It is to surmount these obstacles that this provision was put in. It provides a
safe method to put the summons in the hands of the defendant, and
the purpose of the summons is thereby effectuated. This manner of
service may be used only upon order of the presiding judge.
Service may also be made by publication where, after diligent
inquiry, the whereabouts of the defendant cannot be ascertained. 159
Publication is accomplished by tacking the summons to the door of
the diocesan Curia aiid by inserting a notice in some suitable public
newspaper. If both of these cannot be done, then either method
standing alone suffices. The procedure used in service by publication
is within the discretion of the presiding judge. Considering the
rather limited audience that a notice on the door of the Curia would
have, the judge is almost impelled to use the newspapers. But even
this is not always possible. Father Doheny'1 0 cautions that in some
states this would make the ecclesiastical court subject to arrest. 16
The Code allows service by publication only where careful investigation has failed to uncover the defendant's whereabouts. This
injunction is repeated in the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation
of the Sacraments. Canon 1894 states that a sentence is vitiated by
remedial nullity where there was no legal summons. Apparently this
Can. 1717; Instruction, Art. 79 §1.
Can. 1717; Instruction, Art. 79 §2.
M Can. 1717; Instruction, Art. 79 §3.
157 Can. 1721 §§1, 2; Instruction. Art. 81 §1.
158 Can. 1719; Instruction, Art. 80.
-9 Can. 1720: Instruction, Art. 83.
16oOp. cit., I, p. 257.
161 In Wisconsin this difficulty does not arise. WIs. STAT. (1949) 187.12 provides
that "Such corporation [the Roman Catholic Church] * * * may * * * do all
things necessary for the proper transaction of its business and duties and
all things needful in the management of the temporal affairs of the Roman
Catholic Church * * *."
'5

'55
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canon would vitiate any sentence rendered by a court that was
negligent in its investigation, inasmuch as service by publication can
be made only when personal or substituted service is impossible.
It sometimes happens that the one summoned refuses to accept
the citation, or that he does not hear of the summons where it was
not personally handed to him. Canon 1718 states that he is legitimately
summoned who refuses to accept the summons. Because of the
sanctity of marriage and the indissolubility of its bond, it would seem
on first glance to be presumptuous of the court to proceed to trial
without all of the parties before it. But it must be remembered that
in all marriage cases the Defender of the Bond is present to uphold
the validity of the union. In this way the marriage is defended as
well as it would be with the party present. So too, the rights of an
absent party who would wish the annulment granted are protected.
For such a person is missing only in those cases where the Promoter
of Justice has instituted the action, and that person has not received
the summons. The Promotor Justitiae is, of course, attacking the
marriage to the best of his ability in these instances, and is, therefore,
protecting the would-be plaintiff's rights.
The legitimate service of summons has these results: the case is
before the court, and is no longer a private affair, but a public one;
the court issuing the summons becomes the only competent court to
try the case to the exclusion of other heretofore equally competent
courts; the jurisdiction of the judge is rendered firm so that the death
of the Bishop or the convening of a synod does not operate to remove
him from the case; and the case begins to pend. Once this has
happened nothing may be changed that would change the nature
of the case. 162
The joinder of issues, the litis contestatio, takes place when the
defendant appears in court on the day and at the time summoned to
deny the allegations of the complaint. The process of this meeting
is simple; the parties appear in court and the complaint of the
plaintiff and the denial of the defendant are determined. The court
seeks to ascertain only whether a good cause of action has been
presented, and what points are disputed.
Canon 1630 states that counter-claims should be pressed immediately after the litis contestatio, but they are allowed at any time
before the final sentence. There are rarely counter-claims in an
annulment suit (although there may be in the incidental issues of
property settlement), since they would be merely additional grounds
for annulment, and would thereby constitute the defendant a partyplaintiff with his spouse. In those cases where both parties appear
162

Can. 1725; Instruction, Art. 85.
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before the court asking for the declaration of nullity, either on similar
or different grounds, the Defensor Vinculi defends the sanctity of
the bond alone. His presence at the litis contestatio is not required,
however.
VII. THE TRIAL
With the completion of the litis contestatio the trial proper gets
under way, either in a separate and later court appearance of the
parties or immediately afterwards at the same appearance. The
procedure followed in the trial is quite different from the civil trials
with which we are familiar. The first step in the trial is the questioning of witnesses. As has been intimated previously, only the
auditor or the presiding judge may examine the witnesses. It is
absolutely forbidden for any other person to put a question to any
witness.

163

The auditor questions the witnesses

according to the

interrogatory presented to him by the Defensor Vinculi, and, when
necessity requires it for ascertaining the truth or elucidating an
obscure point, ex officio. The parties may also submit questions to be
asked the witnesses, but this must be done through the Defensor
Vinculi who has the right to recast any of them.1 6 4 The Promotor
Justitiae also has the right to submit questions. The examination is
conducted in absolute secrecy, the only parties normally present
besides the witness being the auditor, the Defensor Vinculi, and the
Promotor Justitiae. Neither the parties nor their attorneys or advocates are ordinarily admitted, unless by way of exception, permission of the auditor being necessary.165 However, each party, and,
inferentially, his attorney and advocate, may be present at the
examination of his spouse. Upon rare occasion the auditor may
decide, after consultation with the Defensor Vinculi, to confront one
witness with another or with one or both parties. Three conditions
must be concurrently present before this is allowed: (1) the witnesses
must disagree among themselves or with one or both of the parties
on some issue going to the essence of the case; (2) there is no
easier way open to the auditor to discover the truth of the controverted matter; and (3) there is no danger of scandal resulting from
the confrontation.'" 8
Witnesses must always give their answers orally, and they may
never recite from written memoranda. 167 The answers must be
recorded verbatim by the notary, unless determined otherwise by the
auditor, in which case the substance of the answer must be given in
163 Can. 1742; Instruction, Art. 101.
164Instruction, Art. 70 §2.
165 Can. 1771; Instruction, Art. 128.
16 Can. 1772 §§2, 3; Instruction, Art. 133.
167 Can. 1777; Instruction, Art. 103 §1 (b).
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full. 168 After the completion of the examination, the answers of the
witness must be read back to him by the notary. He then has the
right to add, suppress, correct, or change them in any manner which
he deems proper to the integrity of his testimony. A dual oath is
thereafter taken by the witness, first, as to the truth of his assertions,
and second, to keep his testimony secret until the publication of the
process, or even perpetually if the judge deems this necessary for the
avoidance of scandal or the protection of others. 169 He then signs the
deposition, as does the D.efensor Vinculi, the Promotor Justitiae, the
auditor, and the notary.
Witnesses may be proposed by the parties, by the Defensor
70
Vinculi, by the Promotor Justitiae, and even by the judge ex officio.
Occasionally witnesses may voluntarily appear and request to testify.
These may be accepted or rejected according to the best judgment of
the auditor. In order to expedite the trial, the judge has, under the
rulings of Canon 1762, the authority to limit the number of witnesses.
This is done most particularly when the introduction of numerous
witnesses seems to be only for the purpose of harming the other
party or of delaying the trial. Canon 1620 states that a trial of the
first instance may not be protracted over a period of two years, nor
over one year in a court of second instance.'1' Thus, it is the duty of
the court at all times to forbid any practice that tends merely to
prolong the trial.
The names of all witnesses must be made known to the parties
before the examination, or, if this is impossible or very difficult, at
72
least before the publication of the process.
All persons may be witnesses unless they are excluded by law as
unfit, suspect, or incapable. Persons who are excluded as unfit are
those who have not attained the age of puberty and those who are
mentally deficient. 7 3 Persons who are excluded as suspect are:
5
excommunicates, 7 4 perjurersy1
infamous persons,'7

6

where any of

Can. 1778; Instruction, Art. 103 §2.
Can. 1623 §3; Instruction, Art. 104 §1.
Can. 1759 §§1, 2; 1619 §2; Instruction, Art. 123 §1.
17' The length of the trial is computed from the date of the litis contestatio.
172 Can. 1763; Instruction, Art. 126.
173 Can. 1757 §1; Instruction, Art. 119 §1.
168

169
170

Can. 1757 §2, 10; 2263; Instruction, Art. 119 §2, 10 .
175 Can. 1757 §2, 10; Instruction, Art. 119 §2, 10.
'7

176

Ibid. Infamy is divided into infamy of law and infamy of fact. It is in
either case that total loss of good reputation that results from some serious
delinquency. Canon 2293 declares that infamy of fact is contracted when one
has lost good repute among righteous and serious Catholics by virtue of his
bad conduct. Whether or not a person has contracted infamy of fact is
determined by the local Ordinary. Infamy of law is contracted by all persons
who (1) are apostates, heretics, or schismatics (Can. 2314); (2) desecrate
the Sacred Host (Can. 2320) ; (3) desecrate the graves of the dead (Can.
2328); (4) have been condemned by law for offenses against the sixth
commandment (Can. 2357); (5) are principals or seconds in a duel (Can.
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these three types have been branded as such by a declaratory or
condemnatory sentence; persons of such a debased moral character as
to be unworthy of belief ;177 and public and implacable enemies of the
parties against whom they intend to testify.' 78 Persons who are
excluded as incapable are: parties or those who take their place, viz.,
attorneys and guardians ;179 judges or advocates who have assisted in
any way in the case ;'80 priests with regard to any knowledge they
have obtained in the confessional, even if the party has released them
from the obligation of the seal ;81 one consort in the case of another
consort ;182 and blood relatives or relatives by affinity, in any degree of
the direct line and in the first degree of the collateral line, unless
there be a question in the case which concerns the civil or religious
status of a person, knowledge of which cannot be secured from any
other source, and where the public welfare demands that the truth be
ascertained.

83

Even these persons,

except those denominated as

incapable, may be heard in court where good reason indicates this
procedure, but they are generally not put under oath and their testimony
is only an indication of proof.

8

4

All witnesses are obliged to answer truthfully every question
put to them by the judge. 18 5 There are two exceptions to this. The
first exception refers to privileged communications. Priests, civil
magistrates, doctors, advocates, and notaries are not obliged to answer
questions which would violate their oath of official secrecy. They
may answer, however, if two conditions are met: (1) they must be
released from the bond of secrecy by the interested person (except a
priest in regard to secrets learned in the confessional, since these can
never be revealed); and (2) they prudently feel that they can
testify.8 6 The second exception refers to persons who fear that
infamy, dangerous vexations, or serious harm may accrue to them or
87
their relations by consanguinity or affinity.
The testimony of expert witnesses is held necessary in all cases of
impotency' 88 and lack of consent due to insanity. 189 In all other cases
2351) ; (6) are bigamists (Can. 2357) ; or (7) do violence to the person of
the Pope, Cardinals, or Papal Legates (Can. 2343).

177 Can. 1757 §2, 20; Instruction, Art. 119 §2, 20..
178 Can. 1757 §2, 30; Instruction, Art. 119 §2, 30
179 Can. 1757 §3, 10; Instruction, Art. 119 §3, 10.
180 Ibid.

Can. 1757 §3, 20; Instruction, Art. 119 §3, 20; Decision, Sacred Roman Rota,
August 11, 1927, R.D. XIX, 428.
182 Can. 1757 §3, 30; Instruction, Art. 119 §3, 30 .
181

183 Ibid.
184 Can. 1758; Instruction, Art. 120.

185 Can. 1755 §1; Instruction, Art. 121 §1.
186 Can. 1755 §2, 10; Instruction, Art. 121 §2, 10.
187 Can. 1755 §2, 20; Instruction, Art. 121 §2, 20.
188 Can. 1976; Instruction, Art. 139.
189 Can. 1982; Instruction, Art. 139.
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expert testimony is required where the case requires it, as, for
example, where the authenticity of handwriting must be determined."'
Experts are appointed by the presiding judge after consultation with
the Defensor Vinculi. He also determines the necessity for them, and
the number to be allowed. However, in cases of impotency two
physicians must be appointed,919 the presiding judge having no
discretion in the matter. Persons who are unfit, suspect, or incapable
of being witnesses are, of course, barred from acting as and testifying
as experts. In addition, physicians who have examined the parties
prior to the trial are not admitted as experts.' 92 But they may and
should be called as ordinary witnesses.' 93 The parties may challenge
any expert appointed if they suspect him of any bias in the case. His
competency is then ruled on by the presiding judge, who, by decree,
94
rejects or admits the challenge.
Normally it is required that each expert make his examination
separately from the other experts, not allowing the others to know his
opinion or findings. 95 However, if it is the opinion of the presiding
judge that there is good reason for allowing all experts to examine
the party at one and the same time, then he may by decree allow
this. 9 6 The opinions of the group should be presented to the court in
one report in these instances, such report indicating any difference of
opinion which the experts have. Where the experts disagree, the
court must appoint another expert. In no case is the court bound
by the opinions of the experts, even when they are unanimous in their
197
conclusions.
Before examining the next stage of the trial after the conclusion
of the examination of witnesses, we should like to insert at this point
a brief review of the rules governing presumptions and proofs by
documents.
In Canon Law presumptions are divided into presumptions of
law and presumptions ab homine (i.e., presumptions which the judge
forms for himself). Presumptions of law are either simple or absolute (i.e., those which do not admit of proof to contradict them).""'
judges are enjoined from formulating presumptions that are not
determined by law, unless they arise from certain and specific facts
which are connected directly with the controverted fact. 99 By virtue
Can.
Can.
192 Can.
193 Can.
'194 Can.
195 Can.
'96 Can.
'97 Can.
198 Can.
199 Can.
190
19'

1792; Instruction, Art. 140.
1979; Instruction, Art. 150.
1978; Instruction, Art. 143.
1978; 1982; Instruction, Art. 143.
1796 §§1, 2; Instruction, Art. 145.
1802; Instruction, Art. 148 §1.
1802; Instruction, Art. 148 §2.
1804 §1; Instruction, Art. 154 §1.
1825; Instruction, Art. 170.
1828; Instruction, Art. 173.
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of Canon 1014 the validity of a marriage is deemed to be a simple
presumption of law. Therefore, it is always upon the party attacking
a marriage to prove its invalidity. Should he fail in this, the law
assumes that the marriage is good.
Canon 1812 states that proof by documents, both public and
private, is admitted in every trial. Public ecclesiastical documents are
defined as: (1) Acts of the Supreme Pontiff, the Roman Curia, and
of Ordinaries, in the exercise of their office, drawn up in authentic
form, and also authentic attestations of these acts made by the
original persons making them or by their notaries; (2) instruments
made by ecclesiastical notaries; (3) judicial ecclesiastical records; and
(4) records of baptism, confirmation, ordination, religious profession,
marriage, and death, which are in the registers of the curia or parish
or religious institute; also written attestations certified from the same
registers made by pastors, or Ordinaries, or ecclesiastical notaries,
and authentic copies of them. 20 0 Public civil documents are those
which are recognized by law as such in each country or state.201
Letters, wills, contracts, and the like, written by private persons, are
private documents. 20 2 No document has the force of proof in court
unless it is either the original or an authentic copy. Copies of ecclesiastical documents must be written by hand, signed by the official
in charge of the archives where the original is kept, and they must
bear a seal. Copies of civil documents are admitted as authentic if
they conform to the civil law requirements for copies in the particular
locality where they are kept.2 03

Excerpts of documents may be

admitted, but the other party, the Defensor Vinculi, or the auditor
may demand that the original or an authentic copy of the entire
20 4

document be produced.

The following rules govern the probative value of documents.
Anonymous letters and documents of any kind are proof of nothing,
and may not be taken even as an indication of truth.20 5 Public
ecclesiastical and civil documents are presumed genuine until the
contrary is established, and they prove those facts which are directly
and principally stated therein.20 6 Private documents whose authenticity has been admitted by the person alleged to have executed them,
or whose authenticity has been recognized by the judge, prove those
things stated therein.2 0 7 Where any document shows alterations, interpolations, or erasures, it is left to the discretion of the judge as to
200 Can.
201 Can.
202 Can.
202 Can.

1813 §1; Instruction, Art. 156 §1.
1813 §2; Instruction, Art. 156 §2.
1813 §3; Instruction, Art. 156 §3.
1819; Instruction, Art. 159.
204 Instruction, Art. 166.
205 Instruction, Art. 165.
206 Can. 1814; 1816.
207 Can. 1817.
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what they prove and to what extent. 20 Where a party refuses to
produce any document upon order of the auditor, the collegiate
tribunal decides what significance is to be attached to this refusal." 9
After the examination of all witnesses is completed, the publication of the process takes place. 210 Included in the process is the
testimony of all witnesses and all documentary proof which has been
adduced. Occasionally the advocates have been granted permission,
prior to publication, to examine the documents which have been given
into court. Where this has happened, only the testimony need be
published. 21 1 After examining all of the proofs of the case, the
advocates may produce additional proofs together with corroboration
and explanation of proofs already presented. The judge by decree
fixes the period of time in which this may be done. At the expiration
of this time, the judge, by decree, concludes the case. This is not to
say that the court immediately enters upon deliberation. It only
means that normally no new proofs may be admitted. However, for
marriage cases, since they never become res judicata, an exception is
made as to them. If important documents or witnesses come to light
after the conclusion of the case, they may be admitted by decree of
the presiding judge. If he rejects them, recourse may be had to the
collegiate tribunal.
Upon conclusion of the case, the parties, and the Promotor
Justitiae if he has impugned the marriage, present their arguments
and defense. 212 The Defensor Vinculi thereafter must present his
animadversions. The parties and the Promotor Justitiae may reply
to the arguments of the Defensor Vinculi within a period of ten days.
Ordinarily the parties have the right to only one rejoinder, but, for
grave reason, the presiding judge may permit a second. 213 The
Defensor Vinculi always has the right to be heard last, but, if he
does not submit his answer to the parties' rejoinder within ten days,
he is presumed to have nothing more to say, and the case proceeds. 21 4
Oral argument is permitted, but is restricted to a moderate discussion
aimed at clearing up obscure points. At no time may an advocate
presume to instruct the court as to the law applicable to the facts of
the case. Oral discussion is not a matter of right, but is granted within
2 15
the sound discretion of the presiding judge.
208 Can. 1818.
209 Instruction, Art.

167

§2.

Can. 1858; Instruction, Art. 134; 175 §§1, 2.
211 Can. 1859.
212 Can. 1862 §1; Instruction, Art. 179 §1.
213 Instruction, Art. 180.
214 Can. 1984; Instruction, Art. 180 §3; 183.
215 Can. 1866; Instruction, Art. 186.
210
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VIII. INCIDENTAL QUESTIONS

During the course of a trial matters may arise which require
immediate settlement before the case proceeds. Among others these
matters may be a contempt of court, the request of a third party to
be allowed to intervene in the case, a question as to the competency
of the judge or of the court, the adjustment of fees and expenses,
and the like. These bear directly upon the case at hand and must be
decided in order that the principal case may be decided. Accordingly,
if such question is proposed by either party, the Defensor Vinculi, or
thePromotorJustitiae, the collegiate tribunal decides whether to admit
it or to reject it. In order for such a question to be admitted, two
conditions must be concomitantly fulfilled: first, it must have a connection with the principal case; and second, it must be founded on a
probable basis.2 16 The court then decides whether the question is to
be decided by decree or by an interlocutory sentence, and whether
it is to be decided immediately or upon the date when the definitive
sentence is handed down. 17 If the question is to be decided by an
interlocutory sentence, all of the formalities observed in the presentation of the principal case must be observed, viz., the issuance of the
formal summons, the litis contestatio, the concordance of the doubt,
the conclusion, and the pleading.218 All such steps should be as brief
as possible to the end that the trial be not unduly delayed. If, however, the point may be settled by decree, these formalities may be
dispensed with. This is the preferred method, since the court may,
after the first briefs have been presented, conduct the entire proceedings by oral discussion. The question is thus settled with dispatch. 19 There is no appeal from a decree or interlocutory sentence,
unless it is coupled with an appeal from the sentence of the principal
case, 2 2 but the court may, for good and just reason, reverse or correct
its decree or sentence at any time before the definitive sentence in the
2 21
principal case has been handed down.
216 Can. 1839; Instruction, Art. 189 §1.
217 Can. 1839; 1840 §1; Instruction, Art. 189 §2; 190 §1. A definitive sentence is
one which decides the principal case; an interlocutory sentence decides an
incidental case, given with the formalities of legal procedure; a decree also
decides an incidental case, but is exercised without the strict formalities of a
judgment (Can. 1868; Instruction, Art. 196).
21s Can. 1840 §2; Instruction, Art. 191.
219 Instruction, Art. 192.

Can. 1880, 60; Instruction, Art. 214 §1. However, §2 of this Article provides
that a sentence or decree is considered to have the force of a definitive
sentence when it imposes a burden which cannot be remedied by a definitive
sentence. As an example, the Instruction cites the case where a sentence or
decree refuses to admit proofs in the case which could have a real influence
on the outcome of the case. Where this happens, an appeal may be filed
from a decree or an interlocutory sentence.
221 Can. 1841; Instruction, Art. 195.
220
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IX.

THE TERmINATION OF THE ACTION

The action may be ended in any one of three ways-by abatement,
22 2
by renunciation, and by the handing down of the definitive sentene.
An action abates when no procedural act has been done for two years
in the court of first instance, or for one year in the court of second
instance, unless some legitimate impediment has prevented the prosecution of the suit.2 3 After the expiration of the requisite time the
presiding judge announces the abatement of the proceedings, unless
the collegiate tribunal has reserved this power to itself. In cases not
involving the salvation of souls, the abatement of the action in the
court of appeal makes the case res judicata. Inasmuch as a matrimonial case can never become finally adjudged, an abatement has no
effect if the plaintiff wishes to commence the action anew at a later
period. The court would probably take previous abatements into
consideration when assessing costs, however, since the defendant is
to be protected from harassment by the expense of annoyance suits.
The action may also terminate by renunciation. The plaintiff may
renounce his action at any stage of the trial, but only in the following
manner and only upon the following conditions: the renunciation
must be made in writing and signed by the party or his proxy ;224 the
renunciation must be communicated to the defendant and accepted by
him, or, at least, not opposed by him; and it must be admitted by the
presiding judge.2 2 5 The costs of the action must be borne by the
plaintiff when he renounces it.
Lastly, the case is ended by the definitive sentence of the court.
In order to pronounce sentence the judge must have a moral certainty that he is correct 2 6 This certainty he is to obtain from the

Can. 1732.
Can. 1736.
mandate of the proxy must specifically authorize him to renounce the

222
223
224The

action. This power is not inferred from the general powers of a mandate.
An attempted renunciation by the proxy without this specific authority is of
no effect.
225 Can. 1740.
226 Can. 1869 §1; Instruction, Art. 197 §1. In defining of what this moral certainty must consist, the Holy Father has said, "Between the two extremes of
absolute certainty and quasi-certainty or probability, is that moral certainty
which is usually involved in the cases submitted to your court, and of which
We principally wish to speak It is characterized on the positive side by the
exclusion of ill-founded or reasonable doubt, and in this respect it is
essentially distinguished from the quasi-certainty which has been mentioned;
on the negative side, it does admit the absolute possibility of the contrary,
and in this it differs from absolute certainty. The certainty of which We are
now speaking is necessary and sufficient for the rendering of a judgment,
even though in the particular case it would be possible either directly or
indirectly to reach absolute certainty. Only thus is it possible to have a
regular and orderly administration of justice, going forward without useless
delays and without laying excessive burdens on the tribunal as well as on the
parties.
"Sometimes moral certainty is derived only from an aggregate of indications and proofs which, taken singly, do not provide the foundation for true
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acts and proofs in the action, evaluating them according to the good
dictates of his own conscience. In some cases the law itself determines the efficacy of certain proofs. Where this is true, the judge is
relieved of the burden of deciding whether the nullity of the marriage
has been truly established.2 27 The law has placed upon the judge a
heavy responsibility, for marriage cases involve the salvation of souls.
It is an oddity within certain individuals that they believe that, if they
have fooled the Church acting through its tribunals, they have fooled
God. To them the declaration of nullity is a green light from God to
contract another marriage. Yet, if through deceit, they have fraudulently obtained the declaration, they are still married to their first
spouse. Any second marriage is invalid and immoral. It is the office
of the Church to prevent her children from offending God where
she can. In trials seeking a declaration of the nullity of a marriage,
Holy Mother Church acts through her judges. And upon him rests
the total responsibility. He may not shift it to another, and no other
may assume it. This is why the judge is not bound by the opinions
of experts, even when unanimous, and this is why the advocate may
present his case in its most favorable light, so long as he does not
distort facts nor conceal truth. If the judge cannot arrive at this
moral certitude of the nullity of the marriage, then his sentence must
be non constare de matrirmonii nullitate in casu, that is, the nullity of
the marriage in the case is not established. 22 8 Undoubtedly this may
work an injustice in a few cases. But the provisions of the law are
designed for the common good, and it is far better that a minority
be denied a right to remarry when in fact they have this right than
to allow others to remarry when they do not have this right. If there
is a possibility of error, the error must be on the side of the good.
If the plaintiff has honestly presented his case, and the court also
believes that grounds for annulment are present and so awards it,
that marriage is still valid in the sight of God if the grounds were in
fact not there. Yet there is no sin attached to a remarriage in this
certitude, but which, when taken together, no longer leave room for any
reasonable doubt on the part of a man of sound judgment. * * *
"In any event, this certainty is understood to be objective, that is, based on
objective motives; it is not a purely subjective certitude, founded on sentiment or on this or that merely subjective opinion, perhaps even on personal
credulity, lack of consideration, or inexperience. This moral certainty with
an objective foundation does not exist if there are on the other side, that is,
in favor of the reality of the contrary, motives which a sound, serious, and
competent judgment pronounces to be at least in some way worthy of attention, and which consequently make it necessary to admit the contrary as not
only absolutely possible but also in a certain sense probable." Pope Pius XII,
Allocution to the Sacred Roman Rota, October 1, 1942, Acta Ap. Sedis,
XXXIV, 338. (This translation is taken from Bouscaren, op. cit., Supplement, pp. 226-227).
227 Can. 1869 §§2, 3; Instruction, Art. 197 §§2, 3.
228 Can. 1869 §4; Instruction, Art. 197 §4.
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case, since the party has the right to rely on the judgment of the
ecclesiastical courts.
The sentence of the collegiate tribunal is determined and formed
in the following manner. After the arguments are all in the judges
of the tribunal meet to discuss the case. 229 Each judge brings to that
meeting his written conclusions on the merits of the case. If he
wishes he may change his original conclusion, but this must be
indicated in the opinion. The final decision is arrived at by majority
vote. The Ponens then draws up the sentence of the court.
The sentence always begins with the invocation of the Divine
Name. After this are stated the names of the judges, the parties,
their advocates and attorneys, the Defensor Vinculi, the Prornotor
Justitiae, the facts of the case, the conclusions of the parties, and the
reasons which prompted the court to hand down the sentence. The
dispositive part of the sentence follows this, and the costs of the
action are determined and assessed. All of the judges must sign the
sentence, 2 0 as must the notary, and the - date must be entered
2 31
upon it.
Publication of the sentence should be made without delay. This
may be accomplished in any of three ways. The parties may be
summoned to hear the reading of the sentence. Or they may be
notified that the sentence is available at the Chancery office for their
inspection. Or finally, a copy may be sent to them by registered
mail.2 32 If either party has a proxy, the sentence may be sent to
him 233 and where a party has a guardian because of minority or
mental deficiency, the sentence must be sent to the guardian.23 4
Once a definitive sentence has become valid, it cannot be retracted,
even by unanimous agreement of the judges, except where there is a
material error in transcription.23 5 Recourse is by appeal. The time for
appeal begins to run from the day of the notice of the publication
of the sentence.2 36
X.

JUDICIAL EXPENSES

Canon 1908 provides that the parties may be forced to pay the
judicial expenses of the trial unless they are exempted by the grant
of gratuitous legal assistance. The fees to be charged for each
229
Can. 1870; 1871 §1; Instruction, Art. 198 §1.
23 0

231
232

The Code Commission has declared that any judgment rendered by a collegiate tribunal is null and void when signed only by the presiding judge.
Pont. Comm., July 14, 1922, Acta Ap. Sedis, XIV, 529.
Can. 1874; Instruction, Art. 202.
Can. 1877; 1719; Instruction, Art. 204 §1.

233
Instruction, Art. 204 §3.
234 Pont. Comm., January 25, 1943, Acta Ap. Sedis, XXXV, 58.
235 Can. 1878; Instruction, Art. 205.
23 Can. 1881; Instruction, Art. 204 §4.
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judicial act as well as the fees of attorneys and advocates are to be
determined according to a list formulated by the Council of Bishops
in each province. 37 The Instruction cautions tribunals to take care
that the parties are not unduly burdened by unnecessary acts or with
the fees of unnecessary experts. The court is also charged with the
duty to see that attorneys and advocates confine their fees to the
legally prescribed list of rates.23 8 In its final sentence the court must
determine the costs and how they are to ,be apportioned between the
parties. 391 There is no appeal from the determination of costs, but
an appeal from the sentence of the principal case automatically carries
with it an appeal concerning these costs.2 0 An objection to th
assessment of expenses may be filed before the court assessing them
within ten days of the notice of the publication of the sentence, and
the court may reconsider and reduce them if it feels it was in error
2

in the first assessment.

41

To the end that the impoverished be not denied legal assistance by
reason of their poverty, Canon 1914 provides that the poor who are
not able to make any payment at all towards the expenses of a trial
have a right to free legal service, and, if they can pay only a portion
of these expenses, they are entitled to a reduction. Moreover, the
court must appoint for them attorneys and advocates who are obliged
to serve without compensation.2 42 It does not lie within the discretion
of the judge to refuse this relief when legitimately petitioned for.
But it does rest upon him to determine whether an applicant is
entitled to an exception or a reduction. Any petitioner asking for
relief must present to the presiding judge documents proving his
financial status. 24 3 Such documents must be endorsed by trustworthy

persons cognizant of the facts. If it becomes apparent during the
course of the trial that relief has been erroneously given because of
the absence of poverty or need, the court may revoke the exemption
2

or reduction.

44

A witness has the right to demand compensation for the expenses
he has incurred in traveling and staying at the place of trial. 245 The
iudge has the privilege of ordering either or both of the parties to
pay into court a deposit to cover the expenses of witnesses. In addition the plaintiff must guarantee to reimburse the court for the
expenses it incurs in the performance of its duties, and the court may
/

237 Can. 1909 §1; Istruction, Art. 233.
238 Instruction, Art. 234.
239 Can. 1873; Instruction, Art. 236 §1.
240 Can. 1913 §2; Instruction, Art. 236 §4.
241 Can. 1913 §1; Instruction, Art. 236 §3.
242 Can. 1914; 1916; Instruction, Art. 237.
243 Can. 1915; Instruction, Art. 238 §1.
244 Can. 1915; Instruction, Art. 239.
245 Can. 1787; Instruction, Art. 127 §3.
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enforce this by requiring a prior deposit. 24 If a party refuses to
make this deposit, the court may consider that he has waived his
right to have his witnesses heard.2 47
XI.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted in this article to give a r~sum6 of the procedural law of matrimonial trials. Necessarily we have not exhausted
the subject. There are special regulations relating to specified types
of trials, as, for example, those involving impotency. Nor have we
even covered all aspects of the normal trial. What we have tried to
do was to condense in a short space some indication of the make-up
of the ecclesiastical courts and their modus operandi.
Behind every trial hovers the spirit of the law applied by the
court before whom the case is tried. And this is beyond all doubt
the most important single element in the trial. For it is the philosophy
of the society which determines its law. Where the society is
atbeistic, it is useless to expect the law to subserve the ends of justice;
where the society is indifferent, justice comes indifferently; but where
the society is ever mindful of the natural law and the divine positive
law, then justice becomes an absolute necessity which must be meted
out in accord with the dictates of conscience and moral principles.
It is in this latter catagory that the Church is most pre-eminently
represented. Her law reflects her philosophy and her reason for
existence. Divinely founded, she has in her care the spiritual welfare
of all mankind. We can do no better than to conclude with the
words of the Holy Father pointing out how this primary concern of
the Church must ultimately affect its judicial process. In the Allocution to which we have hereinbefore referred the Supreme Pontiff
said:
"In the Ecclesiastical Forum the matrimonial process is a
function of the juridical life of the Church. In Our Encyclical
on the Mystical Body of Christ, we set forth how the so-called
'Juridical Church' is truly of Divine origin, but it is not the
whole Church, for it represents in some way only the body
which must be vivified by the spirit, that is, by the Holy
Ghost and His grace. * * *
"This indicates the superior unity and the higher purpose
to which are destined and converge the juridical life of the
Church. It indicates also that the mind, the will, and personal
activity must, in this type of work, aim toward the Church's
end: the salvation of souls. In other words, the supreme end,
the supreme beginning, the supreme unity means only 'the
care of souls' just as all the work of Christ on earth was the
246 Can. 1909;
247

Can. 1788.

Instruction, Art. 235 §§1, 2.
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care of souls, and just as the care of souls was and is the
entire work of the Church. * * *
"The salvation of souls has for its guide an absolutely
secure supreme norm: the law and the will of God. This same
law and will of God will guide the settlement of the cases
submitted to the juridical activity which recognizes and has
full realization of having no other purpose than that of the
Church. Thus will this juridical activity see confirmed in a
superior order what was already its fundamental principle:
namely, the service and affirmation of the truth in the ascertainment of the true fact and in2 4 the application to that fact
of the law and the will of God."1 8

24s Supra, note 87.

(Translation from Doheny, op. cit., I, pp. 1105-1107).
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